> IMO, it is best to not give adversary full access to
> computer that still has
> encryption keys in non-tamper-proof DRAM
I think the problematic scenarios would be if an
attacker kicks in the door while an encrypted loop is
up. The user hits the power off button before the
attacker grabs the machine, but this doesn't help
since the attacker then spray freezes the ram and
recovers the keys elsewhere.
>
> Here is a patch for 2.4 branch:
>
I happen to use 2.4.xx mostly so I'll apply this patch
and rebuild the kernel. Thanks.
It's just a few lines, is there some penalty that
prevents it being submitted to the 2.x.xx maintainers?
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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
