--- Phil <philtickle200@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> --- Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Because loop-aes *is* vulnerable to our attacks.
> >
> > The keying material is in memory when we mount our
> > attack. We were able
> > to reliably extract keys required to decrypt the
> > data on the disk.
> >
>
> So I am right in saying that quitting X and
> overwriting free memory as root with a utility such
> as smem after pulling down the loop will prevent key
> recovery?
>
PS: If so, why doesn't Jari just overwrite the slab
of memory containing the keys when pulling down the
loop? (I previously assumed loop-aes did this).
-
Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
