Re: the cold-boot attack

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Hello everyone!

So as a conclusion of the mentioned time-limited vulnerability should I remount the side wall of my computer case again? Maybe even replace the original crossheads with tri-wing screws? To put it in a nutshell, I fiercely doubt todays police forces are that talented, since they fail to simply boot up a computer.
The described attack has nothing to do with breaking the encryption as such. Compared to this it would also be an option to point with a gun at your temple and simply ask for keys/passphrases.
As a reaction to this "attack" I wonder if it might be possible to use level 2 cache of the processor to store keys in highly volatile memory space. 2 or more megabytes on the CPU die might be a last resort. As gpg prevents leaking keys from kernel ram to swap partitions, newer disk encryption might prevent keys to be stored in DRAM cells. Of course, elderly processors might not do this stunt due to lack of level 1/2/3 cache but newer architectures offer ever increasing megabytes.
Is that a worthwhile option?

Best regards,
Peter
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