Loop-AES and kernel access key retention

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Hello Jari,

I am a heavy happy user of your loop-aes component. So first
of all I want to thank you for your work.

I've implemented some wrapping to enable users to use Linux,
suspend2, loop-aes and PKCS#11 in order to have a secure
mobile environment
(http://wiki.suspend2.net/EncryptedSwapAndRoot).

I've just went through some of the eCryptfs code and I've
noticed they are using the kernel access key retention to
move keys from user space into kernel. It looks quite clean
implementation so that it does not require any patch to
util-linux.

I know that you support kernel 2.0 and above, so the
util-linux patch is required... But maybe for newer kernels
you can allow the kernel key interface support.

I thought of something like user mode for /dev/loop0 and
multi-key-v3:
{
	echo AES256
	gpg < keyfile.gpg
} | keyctl padd user loop:0 @u

Then use losetup or mount without any patches.

The loop:# is required in order to allow a simple
/etc/request-key.conf configuration for loop keys. So even
if key is not provided the /sbin/request-key can instantiate it.

Just an idea...

Best Regards,
Alon Bar-Lev.


-
Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


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