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Hi Andries et all,
As a loop-aes *user* and ex-cryptoloop user, I can tell you one thing - it works, and is stable over multiple kernels, and backwards compatibility is maintained as it evolves.
As for cryptoloop, I'm sorry, I cannot say the same. The password hashing system being changed in the past year, poor stability and machine lockups are what I have noticed, besides there is nothing like the readme here:
loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES.README
Regarding the "backdoor", perhaps it is a poor choice of words, but clearly exposing yourself to the watermark attack on large volumes is unnecessary and unwarranted. How would I, a security person, explain to my customer why I did not choose the better crypto?
Andries Brouwer wrote: | On Tue, Jan 18, 2005 at 05:35:48PM +0200, Jari Ruusu wrote: | |>Fruhwirth Clemens wrote: |> |>>Nothing about kernel crypto is backdoored. If Ruusu thinks different, he |>>should show me source code. Till then, treat it as FUD. |> |>I have been submitting fix for this weakness to mainline mount (part of |>util-linux package) since 2001, about 2 or 3 times a year. Refusing to fix |>it for *years* counts as intentional backdoor. |> |>You call it whatever you want. I call it backdoor. | | | Hi Jari, | | Your crypto is good, your language is bad. | | Clearly there is no intentional backdoor. | You do not gain any credibility by saying otherwise. | | Next, confusing the kernel with util-linux is a strange trick.
I do not see the confusion. Read the loop-AES readme.
| | Finally, in the time I maintained util-linux I have asked you | I don't know how often to come with a series of small clean | patches instead of a huge ugly all-or-nothing monolithic patch. | But you didnt. | | Maybe you don't understand, but it does not suffice when code | is correct - it must also be maintainable.
It seems to have been maintained far better than cryptoloop, and is superior as far as I can tell by using it.
| | Something rather similar is true for the kernel, I suspect. | A series of short clean patches would have solved all problems.
Every tried Jari's loop-AES module? For something maintained outside of mainline, the modules compile and run perfectly across a range of kernels.
| | As it is, time may be running out - some years ago your stuff | was far superior to everything else. But alternative | approaches are being developed, and maybe loop-aes will soon | be some historic oddity.
Perhaps if you implement something like FreeBSD gbde.
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=gbde&sektion=4
Until then I (and I am sure many others) will choose loop-AES because of its clean set of instructions, strong multi-key crypto, on the fly multi key swap or volume (/tmp for instance), easy instructions for GPG backed encrypted root with key on USB dongle. Did I forget to mention tireless support by the author of loop-AES?
I don't care to start a flame war, or to even participate in this one or the politics of kernel code (I've gathered from the archives and elsewhere that the author of loop-AES has tried repeatedly in the past to get his code in the kernel), or to offend any kernel gods, but single key crypto for large volumes is out of the question. Sorry.
Best regards,
- ---Venkat.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Venkat Manakkal Tel:+1-607-546-7300 Fax: 1-607-546-7387 venkat@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://www.rayservers.com/ rayservers@xxxxxxxxxxxx Computers. Installed Secure. Wholesale Prices.
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- Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
