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Petersen wrote: | Jari Ruusu wrote: | |> Petersen wrote: |> |>> http://www.spinics.net/lists/crypto/msg02628.html states that loop-aes |>> 2.0f can't use multi-key encryption without using gpg-key also. |> |> |> |> loop-AES-v3.0a mount and losetup can also read multi-key from file |> descriptor specified with -p command line option. |> | | But don't I need gpg-keys then? Perhaps I misunderstood the concept of | multi-key-v3, is the keys actually gpg-keys? Of course I want a secure | system, but I also would like to avoid kB's of random ascii data for the | case if they disappear, and only have my memorised password left (and | the encrypted partition).
See section 7.2 of http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES.README
gpg --symmetric does not use a gpg key pair.
| |> |>> I use the latest, loop-AES-v3.0a (README of November 27 2004 ), but only |>> swap-encryption reports multi-key-v3, losetup -a reports 'AES256' only |>> for drives created with |>> |>> losetup -e AES256 -itercountk=300 .... |> |> | | So does the encrypted swap in fact use 65 random/"unknown" gpg-keys?
Yes.
| Venkat gave some good explaining links, thanks. I understand that some | file (all zeroes for example) will give identical encrypted blocks on | the disk. Consequently, our all-zero file must give different blocks | upon encryption(?) But doesn't this give easier corruption; for example, | zip-files gets easily destroyed because byte N depends of bytes 0 to | N-1, and if byte N gets altered, N to Nlast are wrong. | | | I found that 'hdparm -W 0 /dev/hdx' is necessary to switch off the | write-cache (http://lwn.net/Articles/67223/). Perhaps you should add | this to your README.
Use a UPS and set up the serial cable. You will be able to fsck a system with encrypted partition so long as you have the keys available.
| Another thing I struggled with a while back, is the confusion around the | cryptoloop/loop-aes that kernel 2.6.x contains. I thought your loop-AES | equaled the kernel option, and supposed doing it 'your way' was getting | obsolete after kernel 2.6.x integrated encryption in the kernel. I never | got the 2.4.x-cryptoloop kernel patch to work, so I did it your way; it | seems now that this is the superior method security wise.
Yes, cryptoloop is borked. In fact I have not seen anything like loop-AES on any other operating system.
When one is paranoid, one has to even take precautions against attacks that involve examining the disk surface with a scanning tunnelling electron microscope and even the the silicon oxide in your RAM. Loop-AES implements key-scrubbing:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/crypto/msg02995.html
So now you can see how paranoid the thought behind the programming that goes into loop-AES is. Thanks Jari!
Cheers!
- ---Venkat.
- -- - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Venkat Manakkal Tel:+1-607-546-7300 Fax: 1-607-546-7387 venkat@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://www.rayservers.com/ rayservers@xxxxxxxxxxxx Computers. Installed Secure. Wholesale Prices.
PGP/GPG Key: https://www.rayservers.com/keys/0x12430522.asc Get Windows Privacy Tools for free: http://winpt.sf.net/ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
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- Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
