Re: Crypto on root filesystem

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On Wed, 2001-12-26 at 23:37, Zygo Blaxell wrote:
> I've been looking for a better solution for encrypted loopback root
> filesystems.  The current strategy used by cryptoapi and loop-AES seems
> to be:
> 
> 	1.  Boot on an initrd
> 
> 	2.  On the initrd, load crypto modules (unless already built in)
> 
> 	3.  losetup -e ... /dev/loop0 /dev/hda1 
> 
> 	4.  Swap roots, exit, let kernel exec /sbin/init
> 
> Unfortunately, this has one major problem:  it seems to be impossible
> to get rid of the RAM disk afterwards, because the filesystem on the RAM
> disk is in use (due to the /dev device inode used for losetup).
> This means that whatever RAM is used for the RAM disk is lost forever.

haven't tried myself, but at least with 2.4 kernels, there's the
pivot_root() system call, which should swap the root and making it
possible to unmount the ramdisk...

I'd recommend taking a look at redhat's mkinitrd package, which contains
'nash', some kind of self-contained mini-shell, which includes the few
necessary commads usually used on initrd's... and add support to it for
getting a passphrase (+ hash it) and other encryption paramters... 

regards,
-- 
Herbert Valerio Riedel       /    Phone: (EUROPE) +43-1-58801-18840
Email: hvr@xxxxxxxxxx       /    Finger hvr@xxxxxxx for GnuPG Public Key
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