RE: encrypting the whole disk / all the data

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Mr. McGee:

	Mr. Mutz's commentary is not complete accurate in its basis for logic.
After all, if one has three partitions, with three different pass phrases,
with only one partition truly being the one with the date (/home /usr and
/), then we enhance the choice the would be cracker must make in which
partition to start with first. He also must then crack (perhaps) 3 pass
phrases before he gets your data!

	Lastly, if you use loop-aes, and encrypt the root partition, then the
cracker must get access to root first, and then get access to the loop-aes
file by breaking its pass phrase. Sorry Mr. Mutz, but that doesn't sound
like less security to me at all.


Very Respectfully,

Stuart Blake Tener, IT3, USNR-R, N3GWG
Beverly Hills, California
VTU 1904G (Volunteer Training Unit)
stuart@xxxxxxxxxxx
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Friday, October 05, 2001 11:40 PM

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Rob McGee
Sent: Friday, October 05, 2001 11:31 PM
To: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: encrypting the whole disk / all the data

On Fri, Oct 05, 2001 at 09:41:50PM +0200, Marc Mutz wrote:
> > Simple question: How do I guarantee that not a single bit of my
> > essential data is written non-crypted on my Linux (laptop-)box ?
> <snip>
> > Then root-filesystem.
>
> What for? Multiple GB's of almost-known plaintext encrypted under a
> single key just makes it easier for an attacker. You should only
> encrypt what's secret. Your /usr surely isn't!

That is a good point, but not the only way of looking at it. My thoughts
in wanting to encrypt the root filesystem are that an attacker would
have to spend a lot of energy to get at useless data.

I figure that the TLA's have taken multiple GB's of fully-known
plaintext, and they have done a lot of research looking for ways to
crack all the known algorithms. If that hasn't taught them how to do it,
my /usr isn't going to help them. Or if it *has* worked and they know
how to break my algorithm, they'll get my data anyway, and I might as
well hide my needles[1] in a bigger haystack.

    Rob - /dev/rob0

[1] No, there are no needles. :) For those of you who are not native
English speakers, that is a common idiom to describe a difficult search.

Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


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