Re: GFS over AOE without fencing?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



In principal this is true.

However, cec is not so reliable of a connection.  It is NOT TCP.  I have little information about how resilient the protocol is, however, in a unit we have with a bad disk, I've had the cec connection spontaneously drop mid-command.  I'm sure they're working to fix this, but it doesn't bode well for something as critical as fencing.  I'm also unclear on whether a dropped connection generates a non-zero exit code (i.e. is even detectable).

Also, on APCs, the fence_apc script has the benefit that the APC switches do not allow more than one concurrent telnet connection, which effectively serializes fence requests.  With the cec, not so much.

Also, this fences the entire Coraid device in a way that must be manually cleared if it gets left masked.  This is a real possibility where multiple nodes are racing to fence each other--especially on multiple Coraid shelfs (as it must be done per shelf).

Since we use our Coraids for non-GFS boot volumes as well, this is also problematic for us, since a stale mask entry keeps us from booting.

It's really not so simple.  I'd almost recommend shutting off the ports at the switch rather than the Coraid, assuming you have good enough switches to do this reliably.

On Apr 19, 2007, at 5:47 AM, Bryn M. Reeves wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Kadlecsik Jozsi wrote:
On Thu, 19 Apr 2007, Jayson Vantuyl wrote:

It is supposedly possible to script using the mask command to block servers on
individual MAC address to the AoE storage.  While this is often offered by
Coraid support as an option, I've not seen anyone implement it.  To be sure, I
have my doubts about it anyways, give that the utility that you automate (cec)
does not exactly provide an API (you actually are writing directly into the
unit's console!).

I have already written the script which does exactly that: i.e it calls 
'cec' and issues the proper mask command to disable/enable access to the 
logical blades. Now I only have to test it in our first testbed GFS setup 
;-).


This doesn't seem so unreasonable - the fence_apc script does a similar
thing, connecting to the console over telnet and squirting commands into
the device's menu system.

Kind regards,

Bryn.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQFGJ0jI6YSQoMYUY94RAkswAJ9k4Yym/PHs/Bwj9AXz0dXTgPCoJACgnoLQ
MEJ63uWPdBTdGMo+GYuJtyo=
=HL8a
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Linux-cluster mailing list



-- 
Jayson Vantuyl
Systems Architect


--
Linux-cluster mailing list
Linux-cluster@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-cluster

[Index of Archives]     [Corosync Cluster Engine]     [GFS]     [Linux Virtualization]     [Centos Virtualization]     [Centos]     [Linux RAID]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Big List of Linux Books]     [Yosemite Camping]

  Powered by Linux