Re: [RFC] memcg v1: provide read access to memory.pressure_level

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On 22/03/2023 15:57, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Wed 22-03-23 14:25:25, Florian Schmidt wrote:
cgroups v1 has a unique way of setting up memory pressure notifications:
the user opens "memory.pressure_level" of the cgroup they want to
monitor for pressure, then open "cgroup.event_control" and write the fd
(among other things) to that file. memory.pressure_level has no other
use, specifically it does not support any read or write operations.
Consequently, no handlers are provided, and the file ends up with
permissions 000. However, to actually use the mechanism, the subscribing
user must have read access to the file and open the fd for reading, see
memcg_write_event_control().

This is all fine as long as the subscribing process runs as root and is
otherwise unconfined by further restrictions. However, if you add strict
access controls such as selinux, the permission bits will be enforced,
and opening memory.pressure_level for reading will fail, preventing the
process from subscribing, even as root.


There are several ways around this issue, but adding a dummy read
handler seems like the least invasive to me.

I was struggling to see how that addresses the problem because all you
need is a read permission. But then I've looked into cgroup code and
learned that permissions are constructed based on available callbacks
(cgroup_file_mode). This would have made the review easier ;)

Oh, sorry, I forgot to mention that salient detail!
I didn't check whether that was a common pattern or not...



I have no issue with the patch. It would be great to hear from cgroup
maintainers whether a concept of default permissions is something that
would be useful also for other files.

I'd be interested to hear:
(a) do you think there is a less invasive way? Alternatively, we could
     add a flag in cftype in include/linux/cgroup-defs.h, but that seems
     more invasive for what is a legacy interface.
(b) would you be interested to take this patch, or is it too niche a fix
     for a legacy subsystem?

After you add your s-o-b, feel free to add
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>

If cgroup people find a concept of default permissions for a cgroup file
sound then this could be replaced by that approach but this is really an
easy workaround.

Will do, once I know the path forward and construct a proper commit message, I'll add the s-o-b and ack.

---
  mm/memcontrol.c | 11 +++++++++++
  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
index 5abffe6f8389..e48c749d9724 100644
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -3734,6 +3734,16 @@ static u64 mem_cgroup_read_u64(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
  	}
  }
+/*
+ * This function doesn't do anything useful. Its only job is to provide a read
+ * handler so that the file gets read permissions when it's created.

I would just reference cgroup_file_mode() in the comment to make our
lifes easier and comment more helpful.

Ack.



+ */
+static int mem_cgroup_dummy_seq_show(__always_unused struct seq_file *m,
+				     __always_unused void *v)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
  #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
  static int memcg_online_kmem(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
  {
@@ -5064,6 +5074,7 @@ static struct cftype mem_cgroup_legacy_files[] = {
  	},
  	{
  		.name = "pressure_level",
+		.seq_show = mem_cgroup_dummy_seq_show,
  	},
  #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
  	{
--
2.32.0




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