cgroup pointed by sock is leaked on mode switch

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Hi,

I got an oom panic because cgroup is leaked.

Here is the steps :
  - run a docker with --cap-add sys_admin parameter and the systemd process in the docker uses both cgroupv1 and cgroupv2
  - ssh/exit from host to docker repeately

I find the number nr_dying_descendants is increasing:
linux-dVpNUK:~ # find /sys/fs/cgroup/ -name cgroup.stat -exec grep '^nr_dying_descendants [^0]'  {} +
/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 80
/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/system.slice/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 1
/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/system.slice/system-hostos.slice/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 1
/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/lxc/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 79
/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/lxc/5f1fdb8c54fa40c3e599613dab6e4815058b76ebada8a27bc1fe80c0d4801764/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 78 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/lxc/5f1fdb8c54fa40c3e599613dab6e4815058b76ebada8a27bc1fe80c0d4801764/system.slice/cgroup.stat:nr_dying_descendants 78


The situation is as same as the commit bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") describes. "On mode switch, cgroup references which are already being pointed to by socks may be leaked."

Do we have a fix for this leak now ?

Or how  about fix this by record the cgrp2 pointer, then put it when sk is freeing like this:

diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h
index d9bd671105e2..cbb1e76ea305 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h
@@ -770,6 +770,7 @@ struct sock_cgroup_data {
 #endif
         u64        val;
     };
+    struct cgroup *cgrpv2;
 };

 /*
@@ -802,6 +803,7 @@ static inline void sock_cgroup_set_prioidx(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd,
         return;

     if (!(skcd_buf.is_data & 1)) {
+        WRITE_ONCE(skcd->cgrpv2, skcd_buf.val);
         skcd_buf.val = 0;
         skcd_buf.is_data = 1;
     }
@@ -819,6 +821,7 @@ static inline void sock_cgroup_set_classid(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd,
         return;

     if (!(skcd_buf.is_data & 1)) {
+        WRITE_ONCE(skcd->cgrpv2, skcd_buf.val);
         skcd_buf.val = 0;
         skcd_buf.is_data = 1;
     }
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index a0dda2bf9d7c..7c761ef2d32e 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1520,6 +1520,10 @@ static void sk_prot_free(struct proto *prot, struct sock *sk)
     slab = prot->slab;

     cgroup_sk_free(&sk->sk_cgrp_data);
+    if (sk->sk_cgrp_data.cgrpv2) {
+        cgroup_put(sk->sk_cgrp_data.cgrpv2);
+        sk->sk_cgrp_data.cgrpv2 = NULL;
+    }
     mem_cgroup_sk_free(sk);
     security_sk_free(sk);
     if (slab != NULL)


Thanks,
Yang




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