On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 1:28 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 2/18/2019 2:03 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 4:50 PM Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 04:45:44PM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 4:49 PM Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 10:50:15AM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> >>>>> +static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent,
> >>>>> + struct kernfs_node *kn)
> >>>> Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
> >>> Do you mean just skipping the whole part when CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That
> >>> is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the
> >>> compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).
> >> So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be
> >> better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's
> >> a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this
> >> boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
> > I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has
> > been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for
> > this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with
> > the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously...
> > Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
> > security_kernfs_needs_init() function, which would simply check if the
> > list of registered kernfs_init_security hooks is empty.
> >
> > I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled -
> > intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next
> > respin if there are no objections to this approach.
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> > index 735a6d382d9d..5b99205da919 100644
> > --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> > +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
> > @@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct
> > kernfs_node *parent,
> > struct qstr q;
> > int ret;
> >
> > + if (!security_kernfs_needs_init() || !parent)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > if (!parent->iattr) {
> > kernfs_iattr_init(&iattr_parent, parent);
> > simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);
> > @@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node
> > *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
> > goto err_out3;
> > }
> >
> > - if (parent) {
> > - ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn);
> > - if (ret)
> > - goto err_out3;
> > - }
> > + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto err_out3;
> >
> > return kn;
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index 581944d1e61e..49a083dbc464 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
> > *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
> > void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
> > int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
> > int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
> > +int security_kernfs_needs_init(void);
> > int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr,
> > const struct iattr *dir_iattr,
> > struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr,
> > @@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct
> > dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init(void)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(
> > const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,
> > struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 836e0822874a..3c8b9b5baabc 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
> >
> > +int security_kernfs_needs_init(void)
> > +{
> > + return !hlist_empty(&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security);
> > +}
> > +
>
> Yuck. That's an awful lot of infrastructure just to track
> that state. May I suggest that instead you have the
> security_kernfs_init_security() hook return -EOPNOTSUPP
> in the no-LSM case (2nd argument to call_in_hook). You could
> then have a state flag in kernfs that you can set to indicate
> you don't need to call security_kernfs_init_security() again.
Well, maintaining a global variable sounds even more yucky to me...
And I don't understand why you'd consider a simple one-line function
to be "an awful lot of infrastructure" :) But at the end of the day it
is up to the maintainers - Greg/Tejun and James/Serge (who I forgot to
Cc on these patches, sorry) - what works better for them.
>
> > int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr,
> > const struct iattr *dir_iattr,
> > struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr,
> >
> > --
> > Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
> > Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies
> > Red Hat, Inc.
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.
