On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 4:57 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 4:12 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Alexei Starovoitov >> <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Tue, Nov 08, 2016 at 03:51:40PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> >>>> I hate to say it, but I think I may see a problem. Current >>>> developments are afoot to make cgroups do more than resource control. >>>> For example, there's Landlock and there's Daniel's ingress/egress >>>> filter thing. Current cgroup controllers can mostly just DoS their >>>> controlled processes. These new controllers (or controller-like >>>> things) can exfiltrate data and change semantics. >>>> >>>> Does anyone have a security model in mind for these controllers and >>>> the cgroups that they're attached to? I'm reasonably confident that >>>> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE is not the answer... >>> >>> and specifically the answer is... ? >>> Also would be great if you start with specifying the question first >>> and the problem you're trying to solve. >>> >> >> I don't have a good answer right now. Here are some constraints, though: >> >> 1. An insufficiently privileged process should not be able to move a >> victim into a dangerous cgroup. >> >> 2. An insufficiently privileged process should not be able to move >> itself into a dangerous cgroup and then use execve to gain privilege >> such that the execve'd program can be compromised. >> >> 3. An insufficiently privileged process should not be able to make an >> existing cgroup dangerous in a way that could compromise a victim in >> that cgroup. >> >> 4. An insufficiently privileged process should not be able to make a >> cgroup dangerous in a way that bypasses protections that would >> otherwise protect execve() as used by itself or some other process in >> that cgroup. >> >> Keep in mind that "dangerous" may apply to a cgroup's descendents in >> addition to the cgroup being controlled. > > Sorry for taking awhile to get back to you here. I'm a little > befuddled as to what next steps I should consider (and honestly, I'm > not totally sure I really grok your concern here, particularly what > you mean with "dangrous cgroups"). > > So is going back to the CAP_CGROUP_MIGRATE approach (to properly > separate "sufficiently" from "insufficiently privileged") better? > > Or something closer to the original method Android used of each cgroup > having an allow_attach() check which could determine what is > sufficiently privledged for the respective level of danger the cgroup > might poise? > > Or just stepping back, what method would you imagine to be reasonable > to allow a specified task to migrate other tasks between cgroups > without it having to be root/suid? Any suggested feedback here? thanks -john -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe cgroups" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
