Unprivileged users can't use hierarchies if they create them as they do not
have privilieges to the root directory.
Which means the only thing a hiearchy created by an unprivileged user
is good for is expanding the number of cgroup links in every css_set,
which is a DOS attack.
We could allow hierarchies to be created in namespaces in the initial
user namespace. Unfortunately there is only a single namespace for
the names of heirarchies, so that is likely to create more confusion
than not.
So do the simple thing and restrict hiearchy creation to the initial
cgroup namespace.
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: a79a908fd2b0 ("cgroup: introduce cgroup namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/cgroup.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index c99b0bcd2647..01f34edceb6b 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -2209,12 +2209,8 @@ static struct dentry *cgroup_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
goto out_unlock;
}
- /*
- * We know this subsystem has not yet been bound. Users in a non-init
- * user namespace may only mount hierarchies with no bound subsystems,
- * i.e. 'none,name=user1'
- */
- if (!opts.none && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ /* Hierarchies may only be created in the initial cgroup namespace. */
+ if (ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
}
--
2.8.3
--
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