On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 2:00 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 03/12/2014 01:46 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote: >> Implement SO_PEERCGROUP along the lines of SO_PEERCRED. This returns the >> cgroup of first mounted hierarchy of the task. For the case of client, >> it represents the cgroup of client at the time of opening the connection. >> After that client cgroup might change. > > Even if people decide that sending cgroups over a unix socket is a good > idea, this API has my NAK in the strongest possible sense, for whatever > my NAK is worth. > > IMO SO_PEERCRED is a disaster. Calling send(2) or write(2) should > *never* imply the use of a credential. A program should always have to > *explicitly* request use of a credential. What you want is SCM_CGROUP. > > (I've found privilege escalations before based on this observation, and > I suspect I'll find them again.) > > > Note that I think that you really want SCM_SOMETHING_ELSE and not > SCM_CGROUP, but I don't know what the use case is yet. This might not be quite as awful as I thought. At least you're looking up the cgroup at connection time instead of at send time. OTOH, this is still racy -- the socket could easily outlive the cgroup that created it. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe cgroups" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
