On 1/23/24 22:47, Jeff Layton wrote:
On Tue, 2024-01-23 at 21:12 +0800, xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx>
A short read may occur while reading the message footer from the
socket. Later, when the socket is ready for another read, the
messenger shoudl invoke all read_partial* handlers, except the
read_partial_sparse_msg_data(). The contract between the messenger
and these handlers is that the handlers should bail if the area
of the message is responsible for is already processed. So,
in this case, it's expected that read_sparse_msg_data() would bail,
allowing the messenger to invoke read_partial() for the footer and
pick up where it left off.
However read_partial_sparse_msg_data() violates that contract and
ends up calling into the state machine in the OSD client. The
sparse-read state machine just assumes that it's a new op and
interprets some piece of the footer as the sparse-read extents/data
and then returns bogus extents/data length, etc.
This will just reuse the 'total_resid' to determine whether should
the read_partial_sparse_msg_data() bail out or not. Because once
it reaches to zero that means all the extents and data have been
successfully received in last read, else it could break out when
partially reading any of the extents and data. And then the
osd_sparse_read() could continue where it left off.
Thanks for the detailed description. That really helps!
I just copied from Ilya's comments and with some changes.
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/63586
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 2 +-
net/ceph/messenger_v1.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 4 ++--
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 9 +++------
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
index 2eaaabbe98cb..1717cc57cdac 100644
--- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ struct ceph_msg {
struct kref kref;
bool more_to_follow;
bool needs_out_seq;
- bool sparse_read;
+ u64 sparse_read_total;
int front_alloc_len;
struct ceph_msgpool *pool;
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c
index 4cb60bacf5f5..4c76c8390de1 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c
@@ -160,8 +160,9 @@ static size_t sizeof_footer(struct ceph_connection *con)
static void prepare_message_data(struct ceph_msg *msg, u32 data_len)
{
/* Initialize data cursor if it's not a sparse read */
- if (!msg->sparse_read)
- ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, data_len);
+ u64 len = msg->sparse_read_total ? : data_len;
+
+ ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, len);
}
/*
@@ -1036,7 +1037,7 @@ static int read_partial_sparse_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con)
if (do_datacrc)
crc = con->in_data_crc;
- do {
+ while (cursor->total_resid) {
if (con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base)
ret = read_partial_message_chunk(con,
&con->v1.in_sr_kvec,
@@ -1044,23 +1045,23 @@ static int read_partial_sparse_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con)
&crc);
else if (cursor->sr_resid > 0)
ret = read_partial_sparse_msg_extent(con, &crc);
-
- if (ret <= 0) {
- if (do_datacrc)
- con->in_data_crc = crc;
- return ret;
- }
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ break;
memset(&con->v1.in_sr_kvec, 0, sizeof(con->v1.in_sr_kvec));
ret = con->ops->sparse_read(con, cursor,
(char **)&con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ret = ret ? : 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */
nit: this syntax is a gcc-ism (AIUI) and is not preferred. It'd be
better spell it out in this case (particularly since it's only 4 extra
chars:
ret = ret ? ret : 1;
Sure.
Thanks Jeff.
- Xiubo
+ break;
+ }
con->v1.in_sr_len = ret;
- } while (ret > 0);
+ }
if (do_datacrc)
con->in_data_crc = crc;
- return ret < 0 ? ret : 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */
+ return ret;
}
static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con)
@@ -1253,7 +1254,7 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con)
if (!m->num_data_items)
return -EIO;
- if (m->sparse_read)
+ if (m->sparse_read_total)
ret = read_partial_sparse_msg_data(con);
else if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE))
ret = read_partial_msg_data_bounce(con);
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
index f8ec60e1aba3..a0ca5414b333 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con)
struct sg_table enc_sgt = {};
struct sg_table sgt = {};
struct page **pages = NULL;
- bool sparse = con->in_msg->sparse_read;
+ bool sparse = !!con->in_msg->sparse_read_total;
int dpos = 0;
int tail_len;
int ret;
@@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ static int prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con)
}
if (data_len(msg)) {
- if (msg->sparse_read)
+ if (msg->sparse_read_total)
con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA;
else
con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA;
diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
index 6beab9be51e2..1a5b1e1e24ca 100644
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -5510,7 +5510,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
}
m = ceph_msg_get(req->r_reply);
- m->sparse_read = (bool)srlen;
+ m->sparse_read_total = srlen;
dout("get_reply tid %lld %p\n", tid, m);
@@ -5777,11 +5777,8 @@ static int prep_next_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con,
}
if (o->o_sparse_op_idx < 0) {
- u64 srlen = sparse_data_requested(req);
-
- dout("%s: [%d] starting new sparse read req. srlen=0x%llx\n",
- __func__, o->o_osd, srlen);
- ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(cursor, con->in_msg, srlen);
+ dout("%s: [%d] starting new sparse read req\n",
+ __func__, o->o_osd);
} else {
u64 end;
The patch itself looks fine though.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
