Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to ceph_tcp_connect(). This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect() throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches targeting various trees. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@xxxxxxxxxx/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@xxxxxxxxxx/ Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect") Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@xxxxxxxxxx> --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index 10a41cd9c5235..3c8b78d9c4d1c 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -459,8 +459,8 @@ int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) set_sock_callbacks(sock, con); con_sock_state_connecting(con); - ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), - O_NONBLOCK); + ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), + O_NONBLOCK); if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr), -- 2.42.0.582.g8ccd20d70d-goog
