Dear colleagues,
On Wed, 5 Jan 2022 15:10:23 +0100
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 12:40:51PM -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > On Tue, 2022-01-04 at 15:04 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > Inode operations that create a new filesystem object such as ->mknod,
> > > ->create, ->mkdir() and others don't take a {g,u}id argument explicitly.
> > > Instead the caller's fs{g,u}id is used for the {g,u}id of the new
> > > filesystem object.
> > >
> > > Cephfs mds creation request argument structures mirror this filesystem
> > > behavior. They don't encode a {g,u}id explicitly. Instead the caller's
> > > fs{g,u}id that is always sent as part of any mds request is used by the
> > > servers to set the {g,u}id of the new filesystem object.
> > >
> > > In order to ensure that the correct {g,u}id is used map the caller's
> > > fs{g,u}id for creation requests. This doesn't require complex changes.
> > > It suffices to pass in the relevant idmapping recorded in the request
> > > message. If this request message was triggered from an inode operation
> > > that creates filesystem objects it will have passed down the relevant
> > > idmaping. If this is a request message that was triggered from an inode
> > > operation that doens't need to take idmappings into account the initial
> > > idmapping is passed down which is an identity mapping and thus is
> > > guaranteed to leave the caller's fs{g,u}id unchanged.,u}id is sent.
> > >
> > > The last few weeks before Christmas 2021 I have spent time not just
> > > reading and poking the cephfs kernel code but also took a look at the
> > > ceph mds server userspace to ensure I didn't miss some subtlety.
> > >
> > > This made me aware of one complication to solve. All requests send the
> > > caller's fs{g,u}id over the wire. The caller's fs{g,u}id matters for the
> > > server in exactly two cases:
> > >
> > > 1. to set the ownership for creation requests
> > > 2. to determine whether this client is allowed access on this server
> > >
> > > Case 1. we already covered and explained. Case 2. is only relevant for
> > > servers where an explicit uid access restriction has been set. That is
> > > to say the mds server restricts access to requests coming from a
> > > specific uid. Servers without uid restrictions will grant access to
> > > requests from any uid by setting MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY.
> > >
> > > Case 2. introduces the complication because the caller's fs{g,u}id is
> > > not just used to record ownership but also serves as the {g,u}id used
> > > when checking access to the server.
> > >
> > > Consider a user mounting a cephfs client and creating an idmapped mount
> > > from it that maps files owned by uid 1000 to be owned uid 0:
> > >
> > > mount -t cephfs -o [...] /unmapped
> > > mount-idmapped --map-mount 1000:0:1 /idmapped
> > >
> > > That is to say if the mounted cephfs filesystem contains a file "file1"
> > > which is owned by uid 1000:
> > >
> > > - looking at it via /unmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> > > (One can think of this as the on-disk value.)
> > > - looking at it via /idmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 0
> > >
> > > Now, consider creating new files via the idmapped mount at /idmapped.
> > > When a caller with fs{g,u}id 1000 creates a file "file2" by going
> > > through the idmapped mount mounted at /idmapped it will create a file
> > > that is owned by uid 1000 on-disk, i.e.:
> > >
> > > - looking at it via /unmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> > > - looking at it via /idmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 0
> > >
> > > Now consider an mds server that has a uid access restriction set and
> > > only grants access to requests from uid 0.
> > >
> > > If the client sends a creation request for a file e.g. /idmapped/file2
> > > it will send the caller's fs{g,u}id idmapped according to the idmapped
> > > mount. So if the caller has fs{g,u}id 1000 it will be mapped to {g,u}id
> > > 0 in the idmapped mount and will be sent over the wire allowing the
> > > caller access to the mds server.
> > >
> > > However, if the caller is not issuing a creation request the caller's
> > > fs{g,u}id will be send without the mount's idmapping applied. So if the
> > > caller that just successfully created a new file on the restricted mds
> > > server sends a request as fs{g,u}id 1000 access will be refused. This
> > > however is inconsistent.
> > >
> >
> > IDGI, why would you send the fs{g,u}id without the mount's idmapping
> > applied in this case? ISTM that idmapping is wholly a client-side
> > feature, and that you should always map id's regardless of whether
> > you're creating or not.
>
> Since the idmapping is a property of the mount and not a property of the
> caller the caller's fs{g,u}id aren't mapped. What is mapped are the
> inode's i{g,u}id when accessed from a particular mount.
>
> The fs{g,u}id are only ever mapped when a new filesystem object is
> created. So if I have an idmapped mount that makes it so that files
> owned by 1000 on-disk appear to be owned by uid 0 then a user with uid 0
> creating a new file will create files with uid 1000 on-disk when going
> through that mount. For cephfs that'd be the uid we would be sending
> with creation requests as I've currently written it.
>
> So then when the user looks at the file it created it will see it as
> being owned by uid 0 from that idmapped mount (whereas on-disk it's
> 1000). But the user's fs{g,u}id isn't per se changed when going through
> that mount. So in my opinion I was thinking that the server with access
> permissions set would want to always check permissions on the users
> "raw" fs{g,u}id. That would mean I'd have to change the patch obviously.
> My suggestion was to send the {g,u}id the file will be created with
> separately. The alternative would be to not just pass the idmapping into
> the creation iop's but into all iops so that we can always map it for
> cephfs. But this would mean a lot of vfs changes for one filesystem. So
> if we could first explore alternatives approaches I'd be grateful.
I can't understand which kind of operations we are talking about here.
Right now almost all inode_operations are taking struct mnt_idmap as a parameter
(at the moment of this series was posted it was struct user_namespace, but that's not important).
The only iops those are not taking idmap is lookup, readlink, fiemap, update_time, atomic_open
and a few more. So, we want to pass struct mnt_idmap to them to always map current_fs{g,u}id
according to a mount idmapping? As Christian pointed above:
> Since the idmapping is a property of the mount and not a property of the
> caller the caller's fs{g,u}id aren't mapped. What is mapped are the
> inode's i{g,u}id when accessed from a particular mount.
If we want to go this way then we don't need to pass mnt_idmap to any additional inode ops
and the current approach works fine. Please, correct me if I'm wrong.
>
> (I'll be traveling for the latter half of this week starting today at
> CET afternoon so apologies but I'll probably take some time to respond.)
>
P.S.
I'm trying to make a respin for this series, I've made a formal rebase on top of
the current Linux kernel tree and fixed it according to the Jeff's review comment:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/041afbfd171915d62ab9a93c7a35d9c9d5c5bf7b.camel@xxxxxxxxxx/
This thing is really important for LXD/LXC project so I'll be happy to help with pushing
this forward.
Current tree:
https://github.com/mihalicyn/linux/commits/fs.idmapped.ceph.v2
Kind regards,
Alex
