Re: [PATCH V7] ceph: do not dencrypt the dentry name twice for readdir

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On 3/10/22 8:27 AM, Jeff Layton wrote:
On Thu, 2022-03-10 at 08:20 +0800, Xiubo Li wrote:
On 3/9/22 10:50 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:
On Wed, 2022-03-09 at 21:59 +0800, xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx>

For the readdir request the dentries will be pasred and dencrypted
in ceph_readdir_prepopulate(). And in ceph_readdir() we could just
get the dentry name from the dentry cache instead of parsing and
dencrypting them again. This could improve performance.

Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

V7:
- Fix the xfstest generic/006 crash bug about the rde->dentry == NULL.

V6:
- Remove CEPH_ENCRYPTED_LONG_SNAP_NAME_MAX macro and use the NAME_MAX
    instead, since we are limiting the max length of snapshot name to
    240, which is NAME_MAX - 2 * sizeof('_') - sizeof(<inode#>).

V5:
- fix typo of CEPH_ENCRYPTED_LONG_SNAP_NAME_MAX macro
- release the rde->dentry in destroy_reply_info



   fs/ceph/dir.c        | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
   fs/ceph/inode.c      |  7 ++++++
   fs/ceph/mds_client.c |  1 +
   fs/ceph/mds_client.h |  1 +
   4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c
index 6df2a91af236..2397c34e9173 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c
@@ -316,8 +316,7 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
   	int err;
   	unsigned frag = -1;
   	struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo;
-	struct fscrypt_str tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
-	struct fscrypt_str oname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
+	char *dentry_name = NULL;
dout("readdir %p file %p pos %llx\n", inode, file, ctx->pos);
   	if (dfi->file_info.flags & CEPH_F_ATEND)
@@ -369,14 +368,6 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
   		spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
   	}
- err = ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(inode, &tname);
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(inode, &oname);
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto out;
-
   	/* proceed with a normal readdir */
   more:
   	/* do we have the correct frag content buffered? */
@@ -528,31 +519,36 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
   			}
   		}
   	}
+
+	dentry_name = kmalloc(NAME_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!dentry_name) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		ceph_mdsc_put_request(dfi->last_readdir);
+		dfi->last_readdir = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
   	for (; i < rinfo->dir_nr; i++) {
   		struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = rinfo->dir_entries + i;
-		struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir	= inode,
-					    .name	= rde->name,
-					    .name_len	= rde->name_len,
-					    .ctext	= rde->altname,
-					    .ctext_len	= rde->altname_len };
-		u32 olen = oname.len;
-
-		err = ceph_fname_to_usr(&fname, &tname, &oname, NULL);
-		if (err) {
-			pr_err("%s unable to decode %.*s, got %d\n", __func__,
-			       rde->name_len, rde->name, err);
-			goto out;
-		}
+		struct dentry *dn = rde->dentry;
+		int name_len;
BUG_ON(rde->offset < ctx->pos);
   		BUG_ON(!rde->inode.in);
+		BUG_ON(!rde->dentry);
ctx->pos = rde->offset;
-		dout("readdir (%d/%d) -> %llx '%.*s' %p\n",
-		     i, rinfo->dir_nr, ctx->pos,
-		     rde->name_len, rde->name, &rde->inode.in);
- if (!dir_emit(ctx, oname.name, oname.len,
+		spin_lock(&dn->d_lock);
+		memcpy(dentry_name, dn->d_name.name, dn->d_name.len);
+		name_len = dn->d_name.len;
+		spin_unlock(&dn->d_lock);
+
+		dentry_name[name_len] = '\0';
+		dout("readdir (%d/%d) -> %llx '%s' %p\n",
+		     i, rinfo->dir_nr, ctx->pos, dentry_name, &rde->inode.in);
+
+		if (!dir_emit(ctx, dentry_name, name_len,
   			      ceph_present_ino(inode->i_sb, le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->ino)),
   			      le32_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->mode) >> 12)) {
   			/*
@@ -566,8 +562,6 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
   			goto out;
   		}
- /* Reset the lengths to their original allocated vals */
-		oname.len = olen;
   		ctx->pos++;
   	}
@@ -625,8 +619,8 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
   	err = 0;
   	dout("readdir %p file %p done.\n", inode, file);
   out:
-	ceph_fname_free_buffer(inode, &tname);
-	ceph_fname_free_buffer(inode, &oname);
+	if (dentry_name)
+		kfree(dentry_name);
   	return err;
   }
diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c
index b573a0f33450..19e5275eae1c 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c
@@ -1909,6 +1909,7 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req,
   			goto out;
   		}
+ rde->dentry = NULL;
   		dname.name = oname.name;
   		dname.len = oname.len;
   		dname.hash = full_name_hash(parent, dname.name, dname.len);
@@ -1969,6 +1970,12 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req,
   			goto retry_lookup;
   		}
+ /*
+		 * ceph_readdir will use the dentry to get the name
+		 * to avoid doing the dencrypt again there.
+		 */
+		rde->dentry = dget(dn);
+
   		/* inode */
   		if (d_really_is_positive(dn)) {
   			in = d_inode(dn);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
index 8d704ddd7291..9e0a51ef1dfa 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -733,6 +733,7 @@ static void destroy_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info)
kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_auth);
   		kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_file);
+		dput(rde->dentry);
   	}
   	free_pages((unsigned long)info->dir_entries, get_order(info->dir_buf_size));
   }
diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
index 0dfe24f94567..663d7754d57d 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {
   };
struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry {
+	struct dentry		      *dentry;
   	char                          *name;
   	u8			      *altname;
   	u32                           name_len;
Still buggy. This time generic/013 triggered this:

[ 1970.839019] run fstests generic/013 at 2022-03-09 09:48:42
[ 2001.133838] ==================================================================
[ 2001.138595] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_readdir+0x3f4/0x1dd0 [ceph]
[ 2001.141997] Write of size 1 at addr ffff888120070aff by task fsstress/8682
[ 2001.144897]
[ 2001.145670] CPU: 7 PID: 8682 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G            E     5.17.0-rc6+ #172
[ 2001.149132] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
[ 2001.152477] Call Trace:
[ 2001.153609]  <TASK>
[ 2001.154482]  dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73
[ 2001.155697]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
[ 2001.158021]  ? ceph_readdir+0x3f4/0x1dd0 [ceph]
[ 2001.159654]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[ 2001.160951]  ? ceph_readdir+0x3f4/0x1dd0 [ceph]
[ 2001.168084]  ceph_readdir+0x3f4/0x1dd0 [ceph]
[ 2001.173258]  ? ceph_d_revalidate+0x7e0/0x7e0 [ceph]
[ 2001.178293]  ? down_write_killable+0xc7/0x130
[ 2001.182782]  ? __down_interruptible+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 2001.187246]  iterate_dir+0x107/0x2e0
[ 2001.192677]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0xe2/0x1b0
[ 2001.197570]  ? filldir+0x270/0x270
[ 2001.202806]  ? __ia32_sys_getdents+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 2001.207415]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x129/0x220
[ 2001.211782]  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70
[ 2001.216466]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 2001.220674]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2001.225674] RIP: 0033:0x7f159a774fd7
[ 2001.230170] Code: 19 fb ff 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 ff ff ff 7f 48 39 c2 48 0f 47 d0 b8 d9 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 8b 15 21 0e 12 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48
[ 2001.240821] RSP: 002b:00007ffff90c35d8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000d9
[ 2001.247670] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001186130 RCX: 00007f159a774fd7
[ 2001.255057] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 0000000001186130 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 2001.262428] RBP: 0000000001186104 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 2001.269057] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: ffffffffffffff80
[ 2001.275079] R13: 0000000000000019 R14: 0000000001186100 R15: 00007f159a6996c0
[ 2001.282429]  </TASK>
[ 2001.287900]
[ 2001.291963] Allocated by task 8682:
[ 2001.296303]  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 2001.300491]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0
[ 2001.304792]  ceph_readdir+0x2ab/0x1dd0 [ceph]
[ 2001.309093]  iterate_dir+0x107/0x2e0
[ 2001.313291]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0xe2/0x1b0
[ 2001.317705]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 2001.322210]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2001.327112]
[ 2001.331092] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120070a00
[ 2001.331092]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[ 2001.341495] The buggy address is located 255 bytes inside of
[ 2001.341495]  256-byte region [ffff888120070a00, ffff888120070b00)
[ 2001.352252] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2001.357836] page:0000000089466360 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120070
[ 2001.364225] head:0000000089466360 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 2001.370091] flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 2001.375349] raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffffea00048d7e00 dead000000000002 ffff888100042b40
[ 2001.380833] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2001.386079] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 2001.390919]
[ 2001.395163] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2001.399901]  ffff888120070980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2001.405479]  ffff888120070a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 2001.410888] >ffff888120070a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07
[ 2001.416090]                                                                 ^
[ 2001.422577]  ffff888120070b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2001.430562]  ffff888120070b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2001.438474] ==================================================================
[ 2001.446565] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Hi Jeff,

Yesterday I also test this and others, and I couldn't reproduce it. Just
now I tried several time still worked well.

[root@lxbceph1 xfstests]# ./check generic/013
FSTYP         -- ceph
PLATFORM      -- Linux/x86_64 lxbceph1 5.17.0-rc6+
MKFS_OPTIONS  -- 10.72.47.117:40437:/testB
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o
test_dummy_encryption,name=admin,nowsync,copyfrom,rasize=4096 -o
context=system_u:object_r:root_t:s0 10.72.47.117:40437:/testB /mnt/kcephfs.B

generic/013 102s ... 99s
Ran: generic/013
Passed all 1 tests

I there anything different with yours ? Such as the options, etc.

Do you have KASAN turned on? I generally run with that enabled for most
of my testing (for this reason).

Yeah, me too. The config is:


8443 CONFIG_KASAN=y
8444 CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
8445 CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE=y
8446 # CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE is not set
8447 CONFIG_KASAN_STACK=y
8448 # CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC is not set
8449 # CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST is not set
8450 CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE=y
8451 # CONFIG_KFENCE is not set
8452 # end of Memory Debugging
8453
8454 CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y




Also, I was testing with '-o test_dummy_encryption' enabled as well.
That may be a factor here.

Please see my above test I also added this.

BTW, could you attach your objdump for fs/ceph/dir.o ? Mine seem different with the dump stack you past.

[ 2001.168084]  ceph_readdir+0x3f4/0x1dd0 [ceph]

The totoal length is 0x1dd0 ? But mine is larger than this. Not sure whether there has other config is different with yours.

I base the latest wip-fscrypt branch.

- XIubo




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