On Mon, 2020-09-07 at 22:34 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 12:05:35PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > index 1b11e9af165e..88c672ccdcf8 100644 > > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ > > #ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H > > #define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H > > > > +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> > > + > > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > > > > #define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx" > > @@ -16,6 +18,29 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb); > > int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, > > struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); > > > > +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) > > +{ > > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) > > + return 0; > > + return fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, fname); > > +} > > + > > +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) > > +{ > > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) > > + fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(fname); > > +} > > + > > +static inline int ceph_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > > +{ > > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) > > + return 0; > > + return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode); > > +} > > + > > +int ceph_fname_to_usr(struct inode *parent, char *name, u32 len, > > + struct fscrypt_str *tname, struct fscrypt_str *oname); > > + > > #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ > > > > #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(fsc) (0) > > @@ -31,6 +56,28 @@ static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode * > > return 0; > > } > > > > +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) > > +{ > > +} > > + > > +static inline int ceph_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > This makes it so that readdir will succeed on encrypted directories when > !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION. The other filesystems instead return an error code, > which seems much better. Can you check what the other filesystems handle > readdir? > Maybe. I'm not sure it's better. It would be nice to be able to allow such clients to be able to clean out an encrypted tree (given appropriate permissions, of course). A network filesystem like this is a much different case than a local one. We may have a swath of varying client kernel versions and configurations that are operating on the same filesystem. Where we draw that line is still being determined though. > > +static bool fscrypt_key_status_change(struct dentry *dentry) > > +{ > > + struct inode *dir; > > + bool encrypted_name, have_key; > > + > > + lockdep_assert_held(&dentry->d_lock); > > + > > + dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); > > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) > > + return false; > > + > > + encrypted_name = dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; > > + have_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir); > > + > > + if (encrypted_name == have_key) > > + ceph_dir_clear_complete(dir); > > + > > + dout("%s encrypted_name=%d have_key=%d\n", __func__, encrypted_name, have_key); > > + return encrypted_name == have_key; > > +} > > + > > Only the no-key => key case needs to be handled, not key => no-key. > Also, the caller already has 'dir', so there's no need to use ->d_parent. > > What's wrong with just: > > di = ceph_dentry(dentry); > if (d_unhashed(dentry) || > d_really_is_negative(dentry) || > di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen || > + ((dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) && > + fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) { > spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); > dput(dentry); > err = -EAGAIN; > goto out; > } Ok, I didn't realize that I didn't need to worry about key removal. Your proposed scheme is simpler. > > /* > > * When possible, we try to satisfy a readdir by peeking at the > > * dcache. We make this work by carefully ordering dentries on > > @@ -238,11 +261,11 @@ static int __dcache_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, > > goto out; > > } > > > > - spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); > > Why delete this spin_lock()? > Yikes -- good catch! Fixed. > > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) { > > + spin_lock(&dn->d_lock); > > + dn->d_flags |= DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; > > + spin_unlock(&dn->d_lock); > > + } > > This is racy because fscrypt_has_encryption_key() could have been false when the > dentry was created, then true here. > > Take a look at how __fscrypt_prepare_lookup() solves this problem. Blech. I guess I need to have ceph_fname_to_usr tell whether the name is a nokey name, but that info is not currently returned by fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr. I guess it will need to be... -- Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>