GSoC and Outreachy have made their assignments and I'm very excited that we will have two interns this summer to work on our efforts around improved security for CephFS in multitenant environments! Both Nishtha and Jashan will be joining us starting in a few weeks (mid-May?). Welcome! The other CephFS developers you'll likely be interacting with (besides me) are Greg Farnum (also in California), Zheng Yan (China), and John Spray (Scotland). We have a daily video call (usually 5-15 minutes) at 14:30 UTC (8pm IST, I believe). You are welcome and encouraged to join when you can. We also use the ceph-devel email list, the #ceph-devel IRC channel on irc.oftc.net to communicate, and the github comment stream for code review. We currently have a few things planned: - A "root_squash" mode that works similarly to the NFS option. Nishtha got started on this a few weeks back with some initial patches, posted here: https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/4112 We were hoping we could define some pretty simple semantics that capture both the root_squash behavior (that provides some minimal security when lots of hosts are mounting a shared fs) and also the case where a client is only allowed to behave as one user, as Greg points out that may be too ambitious. - The ability to restrict a client to act as a single user. This is important if, for example, we want to allow unprivileged ceph-fuse or libcephfs users to be properly restricted. - The ability to restrict a client to a path or subdirectory. We have the parsing in place for MDSAuthCap, but that's about it. This will require a range of checks in the MDS to ensure that the client is not doing anything outside of their permitted subtree. My gut says that working out the root_squash semantics and figuring out if there is overlap with the restrict-to-uid behavior is the first order of business. Greg and I talked about it several weeks back but all I can remember now was that it wasn't as simple as I'd hoped... sage -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ceph-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html