On Tue, Feb 26, 2008 at 08:25:54AM -0800, Benjamin Smith alleged: > On Tuesday 26 February 2008, Ralph Angenendt wrote: > > > There is no mechanism for escaping untrusted input? > > > > Correct. At least there's no magic quoting function. > > Ok. So I'm going to have to pull up my sleeves and do this with sed/awk pipes. > Got it. I'll quit looking for a simply solution to this (I thought) simple > problem. > > Now for a more philosophical question.... > > WHY THE @!#! NOT?!?!? > > Bash is used, extensively in many cases, to deal with untrusted data. This can > include random file names in user home directories, parameters on various > scripts, etc. It's highly sensitive to being passed characters that have, > over the past NN years, resulted in quite a number of security holes and > problems. > > Yet there exists NO MECHANISM for simply ensuring that a given argument is an > escaped string? > > How many "homebrew" ISP or hosting administration scripts could be compromised > by simply putting a file in your home directory called ";rm -rf /" ? It's not as bad as you think because of the order of operations. In all cases, these perform exactly as a string should regardless of inner characters. $ f='echo a; echo b' $ $f a; echo b $ dq="echo a; echo b; echo \`\ '\ \"" $ $dq a; echo b; echo `\ '\ " $ echo $dq echo a; echo b; echo `\ '\ " $ `$dq` -bash: a;: command not found $ `echo $dq` a; echo b; echo `\ '\ " -- Garrick Staples, GNU/Linux HPCC SysAdmin University of Southern California Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. See http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html
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