Re: TCP Sequence Number Approximation Based Denial of Service on CentOS Linux release 7.9.2009 (Core)

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It's not a major issue.  Here's Red Hat's stance on it:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2004-0230

And this is a good read:
https://lwn.net/Articles/81560/


Peter



On 18/03/22 6:51 am, Kaushal Shriyan wrote:
Hi,

I have 3.10.0-1160.59.1.el7.x86_64 on CentOS Linux release 7.9.2009 (Core)
running Nagios Monitoring system. We have run an external vulnerability
scan today on this server. The vulnerability reports say the below details.
I am not sure if I completely understand the below issue.

CVSS base score:- 5.0
CVE-2004-0230
Severity : Medium

TCP Sequence Number Approximation Based Denial of Service

TCP provides stateful communications between hosts on a network. TCP
sessions are established by a three-way handshake and use random 32-bit
sequence and acknowledgement numbers to ensure the validity of traffic. A
vulnerability was reported that may permit TCP sequence numbers to be more
easily approximated by remote attackers. This issue affects products
released by multiple vendors.   The cause of the vulnerability is that
affected implementations will accept TCP sequence numbers within a certain
range, known as the acknowledgement range, of the expected sequence number
for a packet in the session. This is determined by the TCP window size,
which is negotiated during the three-way handshake for the session. Larger
TCP window sizes may be set to allow for more throughput, but the larger
the TCP window size, the more probable it is to guess a TCP sequence number
that falls within an acceptable range. It was initially thought that
guessing an acceptable sequence number was relatively difficult for most
implementations given random distribution, making this type of attack
impractical. However, some implementations may make it easier to
successfully approximate an acceptable TCP sequence number, making these
attacks possible with a number of protocols and implementations.   This is
further compounded by the fact that some implementations may support the
use of the TCP Window Scale Option, as described in RFC 1323, to extend the
TCP window size to a maximum value of 1 billion.   This vulnerability will
permit a remote attacker to inject a SYN or RST packet into the session,
causing it to be reset and effectively allowing for denial of service
attacks. An attacker would exploit this issue by sending a packet to a
receiving implementation with an approximated sequence number and a forged
source IP address and TCP port.   There are a few factors that may present
viable target implementations, such as those which depend on long-lived TCP
connections, those that have known or easily guessed IP address endpoints
and those implementations with easily guessed TCP source ports. It has been
noted that Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is reported to be particularly
vulnerable to this type of attack, due to the use of long-lived TCP
sessions and the possibility that some implementations may use the TCP
Window Scale Option. As a result, this issue is likely to affect a number
of routing platforms.   Another factor to consider is the relative
difficulty of injecting packets into TCP sessions, as a number of receiving
implementations will reassemble packets in order, dropping any duplicates.
This may make some implementations more resistant to attacks than others.
It should be noted that while a number of vendors have confirmed this issue
in various products, investigations are ongoing and it is likely that many
other vendors and products will turn out to be vulnerable as the issue is
investigated further.


Solution
Please first check the results section below for the port number on which
this vulnerability was detected. If that port number is known to be used
for port-forwarding, then it is the backend host that is really vulnerable.
   Various implementations and products including Check Point, Cisco, Cray
Inc, Hitachi, Internet Initiative Japan, Inc (IIJ), Juniper Networks, NEC,
Polycom, and Yamaha are currently undergoing review. Contact the vendors to
obtain more information about affected products and fixes.  "
http://packetstormsecurity.org/0404-advisories/246929.html";   NISCC
Advisory 236929 - Vulnerability Issues in TCP  details the vendor patch
status as of the time of the advisory, and identifies resolutions and
workarounds.   Refer to  "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/415294";   US-CERT
Vulnerability Note VU#415294  and  "http://osvdb.org/4030";   OSVDB Article
4030  to obtain a list of vendors affected by this issue and a note on
resolutions (if any) provided by the vendor.   For Microsoft: Refer to  "
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2005/ms05-019";
   MS05-019  and  "
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2006/ms06-064";
   MS06-064  for further details.   For SGI IRIX: Refer to  "
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/20040905-01-P.asc";
SGI Security Advisory 20040905-01-P    For SCO UnixWare 7.1.3 and 7.1.1:
Refer to  "
ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/UnixWare/SCOSA-2005.14/SCOSA-2005.14.txt";
SCO Security Advisory SCOSA-2005.14    For Solaris (Sun Microsystems): The
vendor has acknowledged the vulnerability; however a patch is not
available. Refer to  "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/JARL-5YGQAJ";   Sun
Microsystems, Inc. Information for VU#415294  to obtain additional details.
Also, refer to  "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html";
TA04-111A  for detailed mitigating strategies against these attacks.   For
NetBSD: Refer to  "
ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2004-006.txt.asc";
   NetBSD-SA2004-006    For Cisco: Refer to  "
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040420-tcp-ios.shtml";
cisco-sa-20040420-tcp-ios.shtml .   For Red Hat Linux: There is no fix
available.   Workaround: The following BGP-specific workaround information
has been provided.   For BGP implementations that support it, the TCP MD5
Signature Option should be enabled. Passwords that the MD5 checksum is
applied to should be set to strong values and changed on a regular basis.
Secure BGP configuration instructions have been provided for Cisco and
Juniper at these locations:    "
http://www.cymru.com/Documents/secure-bgp-template.html";   Secure Cisco IOS
BGP Template     "
http://www.cymru.com/gillsr/documents/junos-bgp-template.pdf";   JUNOS
Secure BGP Template

Additional Information

  Tested on port 80 with an injected SYN/RST offset by 16 bytes.

Please guide/suggest. Thanks in advance.

Best Regards,

Kaushal
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