Re: defense-in-depth possible for sshd?

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On 01/10/12 11:12, Bennett Haselton wrote:
What about sshd -- assuming that the attacker can connect to sshd at all
(i.e. not prevented by a firewall), if they find an exploit to let them
take control of sshd, would that imply immediate total control of the
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is ``yes''. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to ``sandbox'' then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions.

http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config&sektion=5

also selinux is everywhere this days... (default mechanism for "defense-in-depth")

HTH,
Adrian

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