On Jan 1, 2012, at 5:23 PM, Bennett Haselton <bennett@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > (Sorry, third time -- last one, promise, just giving it a subject line!) > > OK, a second machine hosted at the same hosting company has also apparently > been hacked. Since 2 of out of 3 machines hosted at that company have now > been hacked, but this hasn't happened to any of the other 37 dedicated > servers that I've got hosted at other hosting companies (also CentOS, same > version or almost), this makes me wonder if there's a security breach at > this company, like if they store customers' passwords in a place that's > been hacked. (Of course it could also be that whatever attacker found an > exploit, was just scanning that company's address space for hackable > machines, and didn't happen to scan the address space of the other hosting > companies.) > > So, following people's suggestions, the machine is disconnected and hooked > up to a KVM so I can still examine the files. I've found this file: > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1358 Oct 21 17:40 /home/file.pl > which appears to be a copy of this exploit script: > http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.de/bugtraq/2006/11/msg00302.html > Note the last-mod date of October 21. > > No other files on the system were last modified on October 21st. However > there was a security advisory dated October 20th which affected httpd: > http://mailinglist-archive.com/centos-announce/2011-10/00035-CentOSannounce+CESA20111392+Moderate+CentOS+5+i386+httpd+Update > https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1392.html > > and a large number of files on the machine, including lots of files in */ > usr/lib64/httpd/modules/* and */lib/modules/2.6.18-274.7.1.el5/kernel/* , > have a last-mod date of October 20th. So I assume that these are files > which were updated automatically by yum as a result of the patch that goes > with this advisory -- does that sound right? > > So a couple of questions that I could use some help with: > > 1) The last patch affecting httpd was released on October 20th, and the > earliest evidence I can find of the machine being hacked is a file dated > October 21st. This could be just a coincidence, but could it also suggest > that the patch on October 20th introduced a new exploit, which the attacker > then used to get in on October 21st? > (Another possibility: I think that when yum installs updates, it > doesn't actually restart httpd. So maybe even after the patch was > installed, my old httpd instance kept running and was still vulnerable? As > for why it got hacked the very next day, maybe the attacker looked at the > newly released patch and reverse-engineered it to figure out where the > vulnerabilities were, that the patch fixed?) > > 2) Since the */var/log/httpd/* and /var/log/secure* logs only go back 4-5 > weeks by default, it looks like any log entries related to how the attacker > would have gotten in on or before October 21st, are gone. (The secure* > logs do show multiple successful logins as "root" within the last 4 weeks, > mostly from IP addresses in Asia, but that's to be expected once the > machine was compromised -- it doesn't help track down how they originally > got in.) Anywhere else that the logs would contain useful data? > _______________________________________________ > CentOS mailing list > CentOS@xxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.centos.org/mailman/listinfo/centos Do you have SELinux enabled? If not, you might need to turn that on, as that would have prevented that exploit. _______________________________________________ CentOS mailing list CentOS@xxxxxxxxxx http://lists.centos.org/mailman/listinfo/centos