KL-001-2016-003 : SQLite Tempdir Selection Vulnerability Title: SQLite Tempdir Selection Vulnerability Advisory ID: KL-001-2016-003 Publication Date: 2016.07.01 Publication URL: https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2016-003.txt 1. Vulnerability Details Affected Vendor: SQLite/Hwaci Affected Product: SQLite Affected Version: All versions prior to 3.13.0 Platform: UNIX, GNU/Linux CWE Classification: CWE-379: Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Incorrect Permissions Impact: Data Leakage Attack vector: Local 2. Vulnerability Description Usually processes writing to temporary directories do not need to perform readdir() because they control the filenames they create, so setting /tmp/ , /var/tmp/ , etc. to be mode 1733 is a not uncommon UNIX hardening practice. Affected versions of SQLite reject potential tempdir locations if they are not readable, falling back to '.'. Thus, SQLite will favor e.g. using cwd for tempfiles on such a system, even if cwd is an unsafe location. Notably, SQLite also checks the permissions of '.', but ignores the results of that check. By itself, this is only a POLA (Principle of Least Astonishment) violation that may cause unexpected failures. However, this might in turn cause software that uses SQLite libraries to behave in unsafe ways, leaking sensitive data, opening up SQLite libraries to attack by deliberately corrupted tempfiles, etc. 3. Technical Description SQLite creates tempfiles only under certain specific circumstances, and the behavior is tunable in various ways; see https://www.sqlite.org/tempfiles.html for more background. Generally speaking, the below does not apply for rollback journals, master journals, write-ahead log (WAL) files, or shared-memory (-shm) files. They may apply for various other tempfile types. When a tempfile must be created, sanity checks are performed on candidate tempdir locations; these checks are flawed. src/os_unix.c (which is merged into sqlite3.c during the release-tarball preparation process) performs these checks when considering candidate temporary directory locations (quoted from commit 0064a8c77b, 2016-02-23): /* ** Return the name of a directory in which to put temporary files. ** If no suitable temporary file directory can be found, return NULL. */ static const char *unixTempFileDir(void){ static const char *azDirs[] = { 0, 0, "/var/tmp", "/usr/tmp", "/tmp", "." }; unsigned int i; struct stat buf; const char *zDir = sqlite3_temp_directory; if( !azDirs[0] ) azDirs[0] = getenv("SQLITE_TMPDIR"); if( !azDirs[1] ) azDirs[1] = getenv("TMPDIR"); for(i=0; i<sizeof(azDirs)/sizeof(azDirs[0]); zDir=azDirs[i++]){ if( zDir==0 ) continue; if( osStat(zDir, &buf) ) continue; if( !S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode) ) continue; if( osAccess(zDir, 07) ) continue; break; } return zDir; } osAccess is defined elsewhere as a wrapper around the access system call: { "access", (sqlite3_syscall_ptr)access, 0 }, #define osAccess ((int(*)(const char*,int))aSyscall[2].pCurrent) So, a candidate directory will be rejected if it does not match mode 07; that is to say it must be readable, writable, and executable. Furthermore, the comment that "If no suitable temporary file directory can be found, return NULL." is incorrect: in fact, if all directories including "." fail, then "." is returned, because zDir has already been assigned before the checks fail. (Also, unixGetTempname, which calls unixTempFileDir, does not check if NULL was returned.) The specific lines of code embodying this check have subtly changed a dozen times over SQLite's history (and things like the NULL check might have been valid in some past version). The first time a check for readability was included appears to have been in fossil commit e7b65e37fd, imported from this CVS commit: -** @(#) $Id: pager.c,v 1.15 2001/09/13 14:46:10 drh Exp $ +** @(#) $Id: pager.c,v 1.16 2001/09/14 03:24:25 drh Exp $ for(i=0; i<sizeof(azDirs)/sizeof(azDirs[0]); i++){ - if( stat(azDirs[i], &buf)==0 && S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode) - && access(azDirs[i], W_OK) ){ - return azDirs[i]; - } + if( stat(azDirs[i], &buf) ) continue; + if( !S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode) ) continue; + if( access(azDirs[i], 07) ) continue; + return azDirs[i]; } As seen here, prior to 2001.09.14 the only permission checked was W_OK, writability. The commit message for e7b65e37fd does not call out this change; perhaps there was some problem that changing from W_OK to R_OK+W_OK+X_OK was intended to solve at the time. As stated above, this by itself is only a POLA violation: a developer or system administrator might not expect a candidate temporary directory to be rejected if it is not readable. This would result in SQLITE_TMPDIR , TMPDIR , /var/tmp , /tmp , etc. being rejected by the above if they are mode 1733 or similar, and also cause sqlite to fail at runtime if cwd is not writable. SQLite does the right things when creating its tempfile, once the tempdir is chosen. It randomly generates the filename (although weirdly, using a home-grown implementation instead of mkstemp, possibly for cross-platform purposes), uses file mode 600, with good file-open flags (O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC), etc. If possible (such as for 'TEMP' databases), the file is unlinked immediately. However, this could lead to insecure behavior by some application using SQLite under these conditions. As a contrived example, a program which writes sensitive data to an sqlite database, and during execution chdir()'s to a directory in which it is not safe to write sensitive data even temporarily, such as an NFS or SMB network share (allowing network capture), or a removable device which will later leave the user's physical control (leaving on-disk residue, possibly mitigated by SQLite's SECURE_DELETE settings). It is also possible that the failure of unixTempFileDir to return NULL, and of unixGetTempname to check for that NULL, may lead to abrupt crashes or otherwise unexpected or undefined behavior by the calling program when "." is also not writable. 4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation The vendor released version 3.13.0 on 2016.05.18 in which the reported vulnerability was patched. Release notes available at: https://www.sqlite.org/releaselog/3_13_0.html 5. Credit This vulnerability was discovered by Hank Leininger of KoreLogic, Inc. 6. Disclosure Timeline 2016.03.24 - KoreLogic sends vulnerability report and PoC to SQLite. 2016.03.24 - SQLite acknowledges receipt of vulnerability report. 2016.04.21 - KoreLogic asks for an update on the remediation effort. 2016.04.21 - SQLite responds that the vulnerability has been patched and will be public in the next update. 2016.05.18 - SQLite 3.13.0 released. 2016.07.01 - Public disclosure. 7. Proof of Concept ######################################################################## # # Copyright 2016 KoreLogic Inc., All Rights Reserved. # # This proof of concept, having been partly or wholly developed # and/or sponsored by KoreLogic, Inc., is hereby released under # the terms and conditions set forth in the Creative Commons # Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: # # http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ # #######################################################################* Reproduction using the sqlite3 binary (but an application linked against libsqlite would behave similarly): patsy@foo ~/sqlite-test $ ls -la total 16 drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Feb 23 22:45 . drwxr-xr-x 19 patsy root 4096 Feb 23 23:04 .. drwx-wx-wt 2 root patsy 4096 Feb 23 22:41 tmp drwxrwxrwx 2 patsy patsy 4096 Feb 23 22:45 unsafe patsy@foo ~/sqlite-test $ export TMPDIR=~/sqlite-test/tmp patsy@foo ~/sqlite-test $ cd unsafe patsy@foo ~/sqlite-test/unsafe $ sqlite3 SQLite version 3.10.2 2016-01-20 15:27:19 Enter ".help" for usage hints. Connected to a transient in-memory database. Use ".open FILENAME" to reopen on a persistent database. sqlite> CREATE TEMP TABLE testtemp(text); sqlite> foo ~ # ls -l /proc/$(pidof sqlite3)/fd/ | egrep /patsy/ lrwx------ 1 patsy patsy 64 Feb 23 23:04 3 -> /home/patsy/sqlite-test/unsafe/etilqs_1974c47b45a40cc9 (deleted) lrwx------ 1 patsy patsy 64 Feb 23 23:04 4 -> /home/patsy/sqlite-test/unsafe/etilqs_81d3a73a2307205a (deleted) The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2016 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://www.korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.2.txt
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