Document Title: =============== Grindr v2.1.1 iOS & Account System - Breach Attack Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1420 Release Date: ============= 2015-05-03 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1420 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 6.7 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Grindr, which first launched in 2009, has exploded into the largest and most popular all-male location-based social network out there. With more than 5 million guys in 192 countries around the world -- and approximately 10,000 more new users downloading the app every day -- you’ll always find a new date, buddy, or friend on Grindr. Grindr is a simple app that uses your mobile device’s location-based services to show you the guys closest to you who are also on Grindr. How much of your info they see is entirely your call. (Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://grindr.com/learn-more ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered the well known Breach Attack issue in the official Grindr v2.1.1 iOS mobile application and connected account system. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2015-01-23: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Benjamin Kunz Mejri - Evolution Security) 2015-01-23: Vendor Notification (Grinder - Bug Bounty Program) 2015-02-12: Vendor Response/Feedback (Grinder - Bug Bounty Program) 2015-04-01: Vendor Fix/Patch (Grindr Developer Team - Reward: x & Manager: x) 2015-05-04: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== High Technical Details & Description: ================================ The grindr v2.1.1 & connected account system is vulnerable to the famous `breach attack`. Remote and local attackers can leverage data leaked by compression to recover targeted sections of the plain-text, inject partial plain-text into application-side or client-side victim requests or aeasure the data size of encrypted traffic of the mobile application and connected account system. The following conditions must match to become a target of the issue ... - Become served from a server that uses HTTP-level compression - Reflection of user-inputs in HTTP responses (context body) - Reflect a secret data (token, csrf-x) in HTTP response bodies The vulnerability affects the ./user module of the server online-service. The following issues are matching to grant the successful exploitation ... - We verified that the page content is served via HTTPS protocol - We verified that the server is using the HTTP-level compression - We verified that URL encoded GET input locale was reflected into the HTTP response context body - We verified that the HTTP response contains in the body a secret token named authenticity_token that is already known as broken of the reports due to the pentest Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= --- PoC Session Logs --- Request POST /users?locale=en_997546 HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 235 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Referer: https://account.grindr.com Cookie: _primus-web_session=BAh7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQGOgZFRkkiJThjODcyYjAyMmFjZDc2NWZkOTk2OGVjYWY2Y2M1ZmYwBjsAVEkiEF9jc3JmX3Rv a2VuBjsARkkiMTRuTzd2WEpwRGtnNjNnNk9rVWFoNXVGbjdJV0NkU3ZsU21iRURtMG5SbE09BjsARkkiCmZsYXNoBjsARm86JUFjdGlvbkR pc3BhdGNoOjpGbGFzaDo6Rmxhc2hIYXNoCToKQHVzZWRvOghTZXQGOgpAaGFzaHsGOgplcnJvclQ6DEBjbG9zZWRGOg1AZmxhc2hlc3sGOw pJIj9Zb3UgdHlwZWQgdGhlIENBUFRDSEEgd29yZHMgaW5jb3JyZWN0bHkuIFBsZWFzZSB0cnkgYWdhaW4uBjsAVDoJQG5vd286JEFjdGlvb kRpc3BhdGNoOjpGbGFzaDo6Rmxhc2hOb3cGOgtAZmxhc2hACw%3D%3D--5f136cf6ae9f490b9ef2d65424bce34afeb59be7 Host: account.grindr.com Connection: Keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/28.0.1500.63 Safari/537.36 Accept: */* authenticity_token=4nO7vXJpDkg63g6OkUah5uFn7IWCdSvlSmbEDm0nRlM%3d&commit=Create%20Account&opt_in=true &recaptcha_response_field=1&user%5bemail%5d=sample%40email.tst&user%5bpassword%5d=g00dPa%24%24w0rD&user%5bprofileId%5d=&utf8=%e2%9c%93 Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: max-age=0, private, must-revalidate Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 19:23:31 GMT ETag: "7d2e9f335d5d83fea93c15bcb81eea84" Server: nginx/1.2.3 + Phusion Passenger 3.0.17 (mod_rails/mod_rack) Status: 200 X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger (mod_rails/mod_rack) 3.0.17 X-Rack-Cache: invalidate, pass X-Request-Id: 89fc8be001a8329aec428209c08529ab X-Runtime: 0.175325 X-UA-Compatible: IE=Edge,chrome=1 Content-Length: 4425 Connection: keep-alive Original-Content-Encoding: gzip Reference(s): https://account.grindr.com http://breachattack.com/ Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= Disabling the HTTP protocol compression Separating secrets from user input in the application Randomizing of secrets in separate request Masking of secrets (XORing) Protecting the vulnerable pages with CSRF issues by usage of a secure token Length hiding by adding own random numbers of bytes to the responses itself Rate-limiting the requests to prevent Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the Breach Attack issue in the iOS application that is connected to the account system is estimated as high. (CVSS 6.7) Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. 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