Folks, We have published a revision of the aforementioned IETF Internet-Draft. The revised document is available at: <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01.txt>. A diff from the previous version is available at: <http://tools.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-00.txt&url2=http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01.txt>. This version incorporates lots of detailed feedback sent by Ivan Arce (Thanks Ivan!). Any comments will be welcome. P.S.: Other IETF I-Ds on the subject are available at: <http://www.si6networks.com/presentations/ietf.html>. And yes, you can follow us on twitter: @SI6Networks Best regards, Fernando -------- Original Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01.txt Date: Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:02:10 -0800 From: internet-drafts@xxxxxxxx To: fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx A new version of I-D, draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Fernando Gont and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id Revision: 01 Title: Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values Creation date: 2012-03-03 WG ID: Individual Submission Number of pages: 21 Abstract: IPv6 specifies the Fragment Header, which is employed for the fragmentation and reassembly mechanisms. The Fragment Header contains an "Identification" field which, together with the IPv6 Source Address and the IPv6 Destination Address of the packet, identifies fragments that correspond to the same original datagram, such that they can be reassembled together at the receiving host. The only requirement for setting the "Identification" value is that it must be different than that of any other fragmented packet sent recently with the same Source Address and Destination Address. Some implementations simply use a global counter for setting the Fragment Identification field, thus leading to predictable values. This document analyzes the security implications of predictable Identification values, and updates RFC 2460 specifying additional requirements for setting the Fragment Identification, such that the aforementioned security implications are mitigated. The IETF Secretariat
