-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Hard-Coded SNMP Community Names in Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series Switches Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100707-snmp Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 July 07 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 (IE 3000) Series switches running Cisco IOS Software releases 12.2(52)SE or 12.2(52)SE1, contain a vulnerability where well known SNMP community names are hard-coded for both read and write access. The hard-coded community names are "public" and "private." Cisco recommends that all administrators deploy the mitigation measures outlined in the Workarounds section or perform a Cisco IOS Software upgrade. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100707-snmp.shtml Affected Products ================= The following product is affected by this vulnerability: * Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series Switches Vulnerable Products +------------------ The Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series switches are vulnerable when running any of the following Cisco IOS Software releases: * Cisco IOS Software release 12.2(52)SE or 12.2(52)SE1 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Other hardware models of Cisco switching products that are running the vulnerable Cisco IOS Software versions are not affected by this vulnerability. Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series switches that are not running the Cisco IOS Software releases that is listed above are not vulnerable. Details ======= Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series switches that are running affected versions of Cisco IOS Software contain hard-coded SNMP read-write community names. The Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series is a family of switches that provide a rugged, easy-to-use, secure infrastructure for harsh environments. SNMP is used for managing and monitoring the device and community names are the equivalent to a password. The hard-coded SNMP community names are: snmp-server community public RO snmp-server community private RW The SNMP community names can be removed; however, the hard-coded community names are reapplied to the running configuration when the device reloads. Cisco has provided a workaround that ensures the community names are removed when the device reloads. Note: Configuring an access list or a restricted mib view: snmp-server community public RO 99 snmp-server community private RW 99 snmp-server community public view <mib> RO 99 snmp-server community private view <mib> RO 99 access-list 99 deny any The proceeding works as a workaround until the device is reloaded. Once the device is reloaded the original configuration is inserted without the access lists or mib views assigned to the community names. Consult the workarounds section of this advisory. This vulnerability was introduced as part of a new feature integrated into the affected releases called PROFINET. At the time of the publication of this advisory, PROFINET was only supported on Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series switches. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug ID CSCtf25589. This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-1574. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtf25589 - Hard-coded SNMP Community Names in Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could result in an attacker obtaining full control of the device. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to ensure the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release specified in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired Releases | | Release | | |--------------+----------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.0-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.0 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.1-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.1 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.2-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |--------------+----------------------------------------------------| | | Releases prior to 12.2(52)SE are not vulnerable. | | 12.2SE | First fixed in release 12.2(55)SE. Currently | | | scheduled to be available August 2010. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no other affected 12.2 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.3-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.3 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.4 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 15.0-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 15.0 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | | 15.1-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 15.1 based releases | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== Manually Remove SNMP Community Names +----------------------------------- Note: The following workaround is only effective until the device is reloaded. Upon each reload of the device this workaround must be re-applied. Cisco encourages performing a Cisco IOS Software upgrade as a permanent fix for this vulnerability. Log in to the device, and enter configuration mode. Enter the following configuration commands: no snmp-server community public RO no snmp-server community private RW Saving the configuration will update the start-up configuration files; however the hard-coded community names will be reinserted to the running configuration when the device reloads. This workaround must be applied each time the device is reloaded. Automatically Remove SNMP Community Names +---------------------------------------- By creating an Embedded Event Manager (EEM) policy, it is possible to automatically remove the hard-coded SNMP community names each time the device is reloaded. The following example shows an EEM policy that runs each time the device is reloaded and removes the hard-coded SNMP community names. event manager applet cisco-sa-20100707-snmp event timer countdown time 30 action 10 cli command "enable" action 20 cli command "configure terminal" action 30 cli command "no snmp-server community public RO" action 40 cli command "no snmp-server community private RW" action 50 cli command "end" action 60 cli command "disable" action 70 syslog msg "Hard-coded SNMP community names as per Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-20100707-snmp removed" For more information on EEM policies consult the Cisco IOS Network Management Configuration Guide - Embedded Event Manager Overview at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_eem_overview_ps6441_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html Infrastructure Access Control Lists +---------------------------------- Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the device interface or the border of networks. If SNMP management is not required on the IE3000, then dropping all SNMP traffic to the device is a sufficient workaround. The iACL below shows an example of an IE3000 with two interfaces configured with layer 3 access, dropping all SNMP queries destined to the IE3000: !--- !--- Deny SNMP traffic from all other sources destined to !--- configured IP addresses on the IE3000. !--- access-list 150 deny udp any host 192.168.0.1 eq snmp access-list 150 deny udp any host 192.168.1.1 eq snmp !--- !--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in !--- accordance with existing security policies and configurations !--- Permit all other traffic to transit the device. !--- access-list 150 permit ip any any !--- !--- Apply access-list to all Layer 3 interfaces !--- (only two examples shown) !--- interface Vlan1 ip address 192.168.0.1 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 150 in interface GigabitEthernet1/1 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 150 in The white paper "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists. This white paper can be obtained at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@xxxxxxxxx or security-alert@xxxxxxxxx for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was discovered when handling customer support calls. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100707-snmp.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@xxxxxxxxx * first-bulletins@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx * cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * cisco-nsp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-July-07 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMNJS386n/Gc8U/uARAmN5AJsGyv7GXrtcrfddAeeDa6U8ZeYhyQCcCIkj EnlJFTHJ1iEyqh41bdAq0so= =qocW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
