Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:
> Maksymilian, good day.
>
> Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 12:40:48PM -0700, cxib@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>> [ SecurityReason.com : PHP 5.2.6 SAPI php_getuid() overload ]
> [...]
>> Using PHP 5.2.6, as a Apache module can bypass many security points.
>
> Am I right that this vulnerability exists only in the Apache 1.x flavour
> of the PHP module? The code in question that sets SG(server_context)
> too late and initializes BG variable after the .htaccess processing
> exists only in sapi/apache/mod_php5.c. For Apache 2.x module the
> handler is 'php_handler', it lives in apache2{filter,handler}/sapi_apache2.c
> and BG/SG(server_context) are initialized before .htaccess processing.
yes
BG(page_uid)=BG(page_gid)=0
should be -1
so
php_getuid() will return 0.
tested on apache 13 20 22
>
> And to clarify a bit the overall picture: am I right that the purpose of
> your sleep.php manipulations is to make Apache to invoke another "fresh"
> child that will process
yes
> error_log contents with errorneous value of
> uid/gid = 0? It seems to me that the effect of the found vulnerability
> can be shortly characterized as "the first request for the given Apache
> child will have uid/gid = 0 as the values returned from 'php_getuid()'
> in the code that handles .htaccess contents (to be precise, in the code
> inside the function send_php() before the call to
> apache_php_module_main(), the point where BG is really initialized by
> PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(basic))".
if (BG(page_uid)==-1 || BG(page_gid)==-1)
will never happen in fresh apache child.
> Am I missing something?
>
php_getuid() is a abstract function for php.
--
Best Regards,
------------------------
pub 1024D/A6986BD6 2008-08-22
uid Maksymilian Arciemowicz (cxib)
<cxib@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
sub 4096g/0889FA9A 2008-08-22
http://securityreason.com
http://securityreason.com/key/Arciemowicz.Maksymilian.gpg
