[=] Affected software : Editor : Novell Name : eDirectory Version : 8.7.x (see note) and < 8.8.2 Services : TCP/8028 (HTTP) and TCP/8030 (HTTPS) [=] External references : http://www.novell.com/support/viewContent.do?externalId=3866911&sliceId=1 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0926 [=] Technical details : A SOAP interface is available at the "/SOAP" URL. It is usually used through the command-line client "edirutil.exe". This tool enforces access control internally : the user is never authenticated directly on the server, and authentication state is kept locally (i.e. client side). It can by default be exploited to get the full DN, modify the name of the log file, read its content, stop and start eDirectory components ... Additional commands (depending of the server configuration) can be used to backup the database to a file, allowing full compromise of the directory when combined with the read_logs action. nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 set_logfile c:\\boot.ini Logger settings changed successfully nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 read_logs [boot loader] timeout=30 default=multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT [operating systems] multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT="Microsoft Windows 2000 Server" /fastdetect [=] Note to eDirectory 8.7.x users : This vulnerability isn't patched in 8.7.3 SP 10. You should instead prevent the EMBOX module from loading (see Novell advisory for details). Nicob
