On 24 Jul 2007 17:40:35 -0000, securityfocus@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <securityfocus@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I don't exactly see how this is new "News" since Zalewski's paper on TCP sequence number analysis (which included analysis of versions of BIND): http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/
That article does not deal with attacks on BIND's PRNG. As far as I can tell, Joe Stewart extended Zalewski's TCP sequence number analysis to BIND's transaction IDs - however I don't think Stewart's paper "DNS Cache Poisoning – The Next Generation" ( www.lurhq.com/dnscache.pdf ) goes as far as the recent BIND advisory here - http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/bind-security.php: "The DNS query id generation is vulnerable to cryptographic analysis which provides a 1 in 8 chance of guessing the next query id for 50% of the query ids. This can be used to perform cache poisoning by an attacker." I don't think that Amit's attack has been described before. cheers, Jamie -- Jamie Riden / jamesr@xxxxxxxxxx / jamie@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx UK Honeynet Project: http://www.ukhoneynet.org/
