On May 16, 2007, at 10:42 AM, graham.coles@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
I too appear to be having difficulty relating this to a vulnerability.
Fair enough...
It works for:
the same user using ssh as is on the console;
If someone can remotely log in as you over ssh then they already
have your
password (or worse, certificate!), so why would they try to obtain
it from
a browser?
They already have total access to all your files, there would
appear to be
nothing more to gain from this.
... but note that reading web passwords from Safari does give someone
*more* than "total access to all your files", since the keychain in
which those passwords are stored is encrypted on disk.
the root user using ssh (or someone who can sudo) can inject
Javascript into the console user's browser;
Are you even considering what you are saying?
Someone has *ROOT* access to your system REMOTELY over ssh and you're
worried that they might be able to retrieve a password from your
keychain.
By this stage, your entire system and every file in it is pretty much
owned.
Again, owning the file is not quite as good as owning the web
passwords, since the file is encrypted, usually with the user's login
password (if we're talking about the login keychain) but not always.
The harm here, as I see it, is that if you have Safari open and have
unlocked a keychain for it, with some valuable passwords (say for
financial institutions), someone who can execute arbitrary code as
your user can read passwords from that keychain that they couldn't
read from the keychain as stored on disk.
I'm not sure if making Safari dump core would also reveal these
passwords; if so that would make this issue more or less moot. And
of course as root one can presumably read the passwords out of system
memory. But this behavior seems to make it too easy, no?
---IWC
