* David Gillett: >> But your point above: >> "without installing malware on the victim host" >> >> Although true on some level, is bogus for the purpose of >> this work, as it being written makes an automatic >> assumption on working only after malware is installed. > > The principle of "defence in depth" is that each security > measure adds to overall security by providing protections that > continue to operate even if other defences have been breached. Isn't it more like combining several things which aren't unconditionally secure by themselves, in the hope that the result is something you can actually live with? > The demonstration that Citibank's "security measure" can be > relied upon ONLY in the case where no other breach has allowed > malware to be installed on the client machine is thus a proof > by example that it does not actually provide such defence in > depth, and in fact for far too many end users cannot be safely > assumed to provide any security at all. Hard to tell. What if the measure helps to prevent customer confidence from eroding any further? I fear you need to do something equally visible against the very visible threat of fake web pages. Otherwise, no one will take you seriously, no matter how well your fraud management processes work.
