On Wed, 6 Dec 2006, Hendrik Weimer wrote:
> Several e-mail virus scanners can be tricked into passing an EICAR
> test file if the following conditions are met:
>
> 1. the EICAR file is encoded in Base64 including characters not in the
> standard alphabet (e.g. whitespaces) and
> 2. the part containing the EICAR file is nested within one or several
> levels of multipart/mixed content.
Victor Duchovni agreed for me to post what he employs to avoid such
issues. This is in some ways similar to a limited application firewall for
SMTP, which is not spam specific and MIME only. Yes, I know, SMTP
application firewalls are the 4th buzzword down the road, give it a couple
of years.
Victor's information:
I have a MIME normalizer in front of the A/V engine. Non-conformant
Base64 entities are made conformant or neutered (super-encoded via QP
so that the user receives the base64 text itself as the entity payload).
--------
In:
CT: application/octet-stream
CD: attachment; filename=foo.dat
CTE: base64
AA AA
Out:
CT: application/octet-stream
CD: attachment; filename=foo.dat
CTE: base64
AAAA
--------
In:
CT: application/octet-stream
CD: attachment; filename=foo.dat
CTE: base64
AA<Ctrl-A>AA
Out:
CT: text/plain
CD: attachment; filename=mime-source.txt
CTE: quoted-printable
=20AA=01AA
--------
Solves all such problems before the vulnerability is found in the
A/V engine.
The MIME normalizer does more, defending other possible
bypass scenarios, but I not able to describe the full feature-set
at this time. It was written and deployeed in Dec 1999.
--- End quote.
All the above is Viktor's.
Gadi Evron.
