-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-security@xxxxxxxxxxx openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx OpenPKG-SA-2005.010 10-Jun-2005 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: openpkg Vulnerability: arbitrary file mode modification, arbitrary path writing, denial of service OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT <= openpkg-20050609-20050609 >= openpkg-20050610-20050610 OpenPKG 2.3 <= openpkg-2.2.2-2.2.2 >= openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3 OpenPKG 2.2 <= openpkg-2.3.1-2.3.1 >= openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2 Dependent Packages: none Description: The vulnerabilities described by this text affect the OpenPKG bootstrap package's GZip and BZip2 embedded software. Similar advisories [0][1] describe the same vulnerabilities, although in context of the particular vendor software. According to a Debian bug report [2], Ulf Harnhammar discovered an input validation error in the GZip data compressor [3]. Because gzip(1) fails to properly validate file paths during decompression with the "-N" argument, a remote attacker using a malicious archive could corrupt arbitrary files with the privileges of the user that is running gzip(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-1228 [4] to this problem. According to a BugTraq posting [5], Imran Ghory discovered a time of check time of use (TOCTOU) file mode vulnerability in the BZip2 data compressor [6]. Because bzip2(1) does not safely restore the mode of a file undergoing compression or decompression, a malicious user can potentially change the mode of any file belonging to the user running bzip2(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-0953 [7] to this problem. In a unrelated BZip2 problem, a denial of service vulnerability was found in both the bzip2(1) program and its associated library libbz2(3). Specially crafted BZip2 archives lead to an infinite loop in the decompressor which results in an indefinitively large output file. This could be exploited to cause disk space exhaustion. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-1260 [8] to this problem. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -q openpkg". If the openpkg package version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution) [9][10]. Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [11][12], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [13][14] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [15], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [9] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [10]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.3, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/2.3/UPD ftp> get openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.*.rpm ________________________________________________________________________ References: [0] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.008-bzip2.html [1] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.009-gzip.html [2] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=305255 [3] http://www.gzip.org/ [4] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1228 [5] http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111229375217633 [6] http://sources.redhat.com/bzip2/ [7] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0953 [8] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1260 [9] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [10] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [11] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm [12] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3.src.rpm [13] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/ [14] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/ [15] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/ for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory. ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx> iD8DBQFCqfvvgHWT4GPEy58RAn37AKCO1mquoh33sAnOG7K4Te5DPZX9lACgo0IJ YmZlJ+9kZyRgnTEIlvR2HRE= =DiNk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
