Alright, I'll bite. After reading the blackboxvoting.org allegations, and your response, I have a few more questions I'd like to see answered. I'll take them point-for-point from your response: > On Tue, 2004-09-21 at 08:05, pressinfo@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote: In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden codes" in its GEMS software. Please explain the purpose of leaving in the apparent debug mode that blackboxvoting has described. If the mechanism described is not a debug mode, what does it do, and why would it be in production software? >These inaccurate allegations appear to stem from those not familiar with the product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate structures in the database. These structures are well documented... Can you please provide a link to this documentation, and perhaps an explanation that offers more detail as to why you believe blackboxvoting is wrong? >and have been reviewed (including at a source code level) by independent testing authorities as required by federal election regulations. Leaving aside the question of who paid these "independent testing authorities," I would kindly suggest that if there is any mechanism which the US public should be allowed to subject to a high degree of scrutiny, it would be the mechanism by which we elect the people who will be making decisions for us. There was no question as to how punchcard machines worked - anybody with a screwdriver and some mechanical aptitude could figure that out in a very short time. The problem wasn't with how they worked; it was how well they worked that led to grief. However, as a voter and a US citizen, I do feel that I'd like to have the right to get my own second opinion on your software, including any versions certified after the infamous GEMS code leak. Please provide all GEMS sourcecode to the US public for further examination. > In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting machine following an election. The key problem here is that this paper record is created >after< the election, leaving voters at the whim of any compromise that may occur to a given machine >during< the election. In a paper ballot situation, the ballot box sits in plain sight during the entire election, and is physically locked at the close of the election. In the case of your system, each voting booth takes the place of the ballot box for the duration of the election, and is hidden behind a curtain or partition with many anonymous people during this process. For the voter, there is no guarantee that what is being stored to computer memory has anything to do with the selections he or she just made, and no paper trail is created until often hours after a voter has left the polling area. Without an immediate paper trail being generated, the voter is at the whim of whatever software happens to be loaded onto the touchscreen computer in front of him or her. > The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the election management software would be immediately discovered during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official total tabulated from each machine. Again, this makes the assumption that the totals printed out of the machine after all the voters have left would correctly reflect the intent and belief of the voters who used it. Unfortunately, without a voter-verifiable paper trail, it is possible for a successful attack to occur. Without the minimal safeguards mentioned above, this attack could go undetected. Regardless of how many votes are compromised, any stolen vote is too many. Please take the neccessary steps to ensure the complete integrety of the US election process. > >From: "Jrme" ATHIAS <jerome.athias@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > >To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > >Subject: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account > > Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes > > > > > > > >Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:38:05 -0400 > >Subject: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78 > > > >BlackBoxVoting.org reported a vulnerability in the Diebold GEMS central tabulator. > > > >A local authenticated user can enter a two-digit code in a certain "hidden" location > >to cause a second set of votes to be created on the system. This second set of votes > >can be modified by the local user and then read by the voting system as legitimate > >votes, the report said. > > > >GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, and GEMS 1.18.23 are affected. > > > >The vendor was reportedly notified on July 8, 2003. > > > > > >Solution: No vendor solution was available at the time of this entry. > > > >Vendor URL: www.diebold.com/dieboldes/GEMS.htm (Links to External Site) > > > >
