On Wed, Jun 30, 2004 at 01:43:11PM -0400, Jeremy Epstein composed: > A slightly less draconian configuration might have a filtering router that > only allows users to visit particular sites; in that case also, the IE > problems would be of no concern (since the redirect to the Russian and > Estonian sites could be prevented). This would not be the case, as the trojaned sites could easily present the malware directly, rather than contacting a third party site. That it didn't is simply a sign that the attacker was less clever and creative than he could have been. Thus all sites which can be contacted need to be "trusted". > The latest set of attacks demonstrate some pretty bad problems, and > Microsoft deserves a lot of criticism. But let's not go overboard. A better criticism is that, yeah, QA is important, but this is a known critical exploit for over a WEEK now and there is no patch in sight. That the crisis hasn't bloomed further with the simple hack: Make the malcode modify any .html it can find, and include itself on that site for download, combined with the continual attacks on IIS sites, banner servers, etc... is a mystery to me. -- Nicholas C. Weaver nweaver@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx