<!-- > Being able to store arbitrary content in a predictable file >location is a vulnerability category of its own An interesting category, for sure. I think this point deserves discussion. Is the use of predictable file locations really a vulnerability? --> If it isn't it should be. I'll give you four that have been put on the back-burner for later realization (make a note that this will be fair warning to the vendor): 1. wecerr.txt still remains a named file in a known location with arbitrary content, that the vendor simply refuses (more than likely cannot be bothered)to fix. This is going to hit them square in the nuts if not now, then in the very near future. And I'll make sure it is zero-day'd. This combo is now both 1 and bordering on 2 years old: <body onload=malware() style="behavior: url (#default#httpFolder);"> <script> function malware(){ document.body.navigate("http://www.microsoft.com");alert ("malware");location=("shell:profile\Local Settings\Temp\wecerr.txt") } </script> 2. Outlook Express deposits an embedded sound file in an html email in the temp upon opening. We are able to access the temp via link: shell:profile\Local Settings\Temp\foo.mid. That embedded sound file need not be proper. That is it can be an html file renamed .mid or .wav and it will still be delivered to the temp. At the moment it is not named but history shows us, with a bit of effort and luck, even that can be remedied. 3. Outlook proper and Outlook Express. When you send a webpage via email, it creates an exact copy of that page in the temp, file extensioned .html along with the name. Again you can access it directly via the above but to invoke or cause it automatically remains under examination. 4. The Outlook Express 'bug' again over 12 months old ~ file being the Windows Address Book remains in place and is still created every time you touch the address book with a few predictable locations: ~ file on desktop or in C: etc. For identity theft which appears to be the latest concern, this is it. Accessing it via remote is quite easy for the reasons already described. The vendor in all cases, just cannot be bothered to fix any of these things. Simply does not care. It seems that the new mantra is "none of our customer's are affected by it" so let's not fix it. WATCH OUT ! All these will culminate in yet another STENCH ! exploit sooner or later. That is a true predicatable path. End Call -- http://www.malware.com