Re[2]: ICQ 2003a Password Bypass

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First off I have notified ICQ Inc. three days ago and what I got was
an automatic reply. I have released the exploit to encourage them to
release a new build of ICQ Pro. The vulnerability may be exploited
locally. If it was exploitable remotely make no mistake that I would
wait for a new release or patch before spreading my code.

And you didn't miss anything. That's right.
ICQ STORES the password on your machine even if you don't want to!

Second off you've supposed wrong! This vulnerability has nothing to do with
connection timeout exceeding. And The exploit has NO limitation.
It does what it claims to do. If a poor soul did install ICQ 2003a on its machine
then all UINs registered on that machine will be vulnerable. It's sad that you
didn't try to exploit the vuln before replying me.
If you had ran the exploit you would realize that ICQ itself sends the
password to authenticate the session the same way it does when you
check "save password" function! SO, there's a password and server will
not refuse to autorize the connection! The problem is:
If you have never checked "save password" function the password
should not be in anyplace. But it's there.
The exploit just enables you to click on Online status and force ICQ to
send the correct password to the server. Got it?

ps: ICQ is vulnerable even when you change your security level to
High!

see ya
ca1

Tuesday, July 8, 2003, 2:49:29 AM, Seva Gluschenko wrote:

SG> Message of CauЦ Moura Prado at Jul 5 13:30 ...

CMP>> Software: ICQ 2003a
CMP>> Threat: Login password can be bypassed locally

SG> I maybe missed smth but does it mean ICQ 2003a and other mentioned
SG> cache registered user's password regardless of yser's intention or you
SG> guys just run your "exploit" just after valid user's session, so that
SG> status might be changed back to online just before connection timeout
SG> exceeds? I suppose, the latter.

SG> As a matter of fact, it still can be considered an exploit, but timing
SG> limitations must be documented properly. It's hard to believe you can
SG> start ICQ session w/o having UIN's password because server will just
SG> refuse to authorize that.

SG> And, I'm afraid to ask, you notified vendors before releasing the
SG> thing, didn't you?


-- 
Best regards,
ca1


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