Re: Authentication flaw in microsoft SMB protocol

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Also found and demonstrated by dildog at defcon 3 years ago. So don't
hold your breath waiting for that patch.

Dave Aitel
Immunity, Inc.
http://www.immunitysec.com/ 

On 19 Apr 2003 13:24:33 -0000
<seclab@ce.aut.ac.ir> wrote:

> 
> 
> Detailed information:
> http://seclab.ce.aut.ac.ir/vreport.htm
> 
> Summary
> =======
> Microsoft uses SMB Protocol for ?File and Printer sharing service? in
> all versions of Windows. Upon accessing a network resource, NTLM 
> Authentication is used to authenticate the client on the server. When
> a logged-in user requests for a network share on the server, Windows 
> automatically sends the encrypted hashed password of the logged-in 
> username to the target SMB server before prompting for password.
> Although the hashed password is not sent in plaintext format, and it
> is encrypted by the server challenge, a malicious SMB Server could use
> this information to authenticate on the client machine and in many
> cases, gain full control over the shared objects of the client such as
> C$, etc.
> 
...
> Exploit
> =======
> We will publish the exploit code after a patch be created by software 
> vendor.

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