-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- iDEFENSE Security Advisory 12.13.02: http://www.idefense.com/advisory/12.13.02.txt Bufferoverflow in 0verkill Server December 13, 2002 I. BACKGROUND 0verkill is a client-server 2d deathmatch-like game in ASCII art. It supports free connecting/disconnecting during the game, and runs well on modem lines. Graphics are in 16-color ASCII art with elaborate hero animations. 0verkill features 4 different weapons, grenades, invisibility, and armor. The package also contains reaperbot clients, a simple graphics editor, and a level editor. The server portion of 0verkill listens on an UDP port (6666 by default). II. DESCRIPTION Remote explotation of a buffer overflow within the 0verkill server source could allow a remote attacker to gain the privilages of whichever user the process is running as. Since there are no authentication measures built into the game, this problem can be considered to be PREAUTH*. This is a very serious vulnerability and should be taken seriously. The following is a snapshot of the exploit in action. deraadt@zeus.theos.com:~$ ./0verkillflow -t 5 -h 192.168.0.1 -o l -p 6666 Attacking host 192.168.0.1 (Linux 2.4.20-grsec). *GOBBLE* id; uname -a uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel) Linux spender 2.4.20 #1 Sat Dec 7 13:44:54 EST 2002 i686 unknown ^C deraadt@zeus.theos.com:~$ su - Password: root@zeus.theos.com:~# rm -rf /& III. ANALYSIS Remote attackers can use this exploit to gain unauthorized access to your corporate network if you do not immediately upgrade to the latest version of 0verkill. We have seen evidence of this being exploited in the wild, and suggest that ISS and Securityfocus increase the ARIS Threatcon to at least 7. Most of our clients have probably already been compromised by this exploit of ours, and those who were not running the daemon as root were probably later rooted locally by bugs in **Abuse that the author refuses to patch. Since this exploit exists in the wild, we will soon send our IDS signatures to Max Vision and Martin Roesch so that they may update their IDS systems to detect this version of the attack, and this exploit specifically. Please keep in mind that these signatures will not be sufficient for other versions of the exploit, and that you may need to upgrade your IDS to a better mechanism that is capable of detecting more than specific versions of an attack. IV. DETECTION To detect whether or not you are running a vulnerable version of the 0verkill server or not, we suggest that you take the md5sum of the binary. For example: root@zeus.theos.com:/usr/src/0verkill-0.16# md5sum server 0f210947eec2ead10e00069896d2f4bb server If your server binary has the same checksum as our binary, here at iDefense Labs, you are vulnerable to this attack and must immediately upgrade your service to the latest version. We're currently attempting to devise a more reliable method to verify whether or not an executable is vulnerable or not, but our research scientists are at this time stumped. The IDS experts from Sourcefire, ISS, and NFR are currently studying this vulnerability and are developing exploits for it, so that they might understand all possible methods of exploitation, and accordingly create the proper dynamic rules to help you detect all variations of this bug being exploited, instead of a single version which ultimately won't help anything. Once this has been done, you can replay your network traffic through your sensors and watch to see if this has been exploited on your network yet or not. V. VENDOR FIX We have not been able to contact any of the developers for the software, and at this time there is no fix for the problem. VI. CVE INFORMATION We have received information from Brian McWilliams which links MITRE to the Al Quada terrorist network, and for this reason we will no longer participate in any MITRE sponsored programs. VII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 11/20/2002 Issue disclosed to iDEFENSE 12/08/2002 Maintainer, Brain (brain@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz), and NetBSD Security Officer (security-officer@netbsd.org) notified. 12/09/2002 Contacted CERT (cert@cert.org) about the matter. 12/10/2002 Attempted to contact CERT again for assistance with contacting the authors of 0verkill. 12/11/2002 iDEFENSE clients notified 12/12/2002 Coordinated public disclosure VIII. CREDIT GOBBLES (GOBBLES@hushmail.com) discovered this vulnerability. *By PREAUTH, we mean pre-authentication. **Please read our previous advisory on Abuse, which can be found here: http://www.idefense.com/advisory/11.01.02.txt " Life without CERT is like the Chocolate Factory without Charlie :-( " -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: Hush 2.2 (Java) Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify wlwEARECABwFAj35GzMVHGdvYmJsZXNAaHVzaG1haWwuY29tAAoJEBzRp5chmbAPnpIA n0q1wFh9yDm8IGzwhFNlgZk5RRauAJ9m9xnpfG+Z/u9f89DHsZsSoaz0VA== =WUCQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
