Iomega NAS A300U security and inter-operability issues

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I recently tested an Iomega NAS A300U and discovered that it has several 
security and inter-operability issues as outlined in the following.

Affected Systems:

             Device: Iomega NAS A300U
                O/S: FreeBSD 3.5 (this has not been verified)
    Manager Version: Iomega NAS Manager 1.2 (P0-080102)
         Web Server: Apache v1.3.26
    CIFS/SMB Server: UNIX Samba v2.0.10

               NOTE: The vulnerabilities described may apply to
                     other models of the Iomega NAS line. It is
                     recommended that you test your system and
                     report any vulnerabilities to Iomega.

                     Iomega verified that the NAS has the latest
                     version of the O/S installed.


Un-Affected Systems:

    Unknown - The Iomega NAS line is based on UNIX or Windows.
    Only the A300U (UNIX based) was tested. The vulnerabilities
    described may apply to other models of the Iomega NAS line.
    It is recommended that you test your system and report any
    vulnerabilities to Iomega.


Details:

    Clear Text IDs and Passwords When Using NAS Administration
    Web Page:

       The Iomega NAS A300U is administered via a web page. The
       documentation states that this can only be done using
       Microsoft Internet Explorer. A sniff of the administrative
       traffic revealed that all the administrative web pages are
       in clear text including the admin logon. Anyone with a sniffer
       can capture the administrator's user ID and password, and the
       user ID and password of any accounts that are created or
       modified.

       The "Iomega NAS Family Brochure" states the following:

          "The Iomega NAS Discovery Management
           Tool provides an intuitive interface with remote
           management flexibility and convenience.

           Encrypted login for the administrator
           protects against unauthorized access.

           Access and manage all client data, NAS
           backup and restore preferences from"
           anywhere on the network.



    CIFS/SMB Mounts Susceptible to Man-In-The-Middle Attack:

       The Iomega NAS supports drive mounts using CIFS/SMB. By
       default the NAS will allow plain text LANMAN authentication.
       This makes the NAS susceptible to man-in-the-middle
       attacks. The session can be hijacked and user IDs and
       passwords can be compromised. The Iomega NAS A300U does not
       provide an option for disabling plain text authentication.



    FTP Can't be Disabled:

       The Iomega NAS A300U allows access to the shared directories
       via FTP. FTP access to the shared directories can be disabled,
       however, this does not disable FTP access to the NAS but only
       to the shared directories.

       When a user connects to the NAS using FTP the FTP root
       directory is the user's home directory. Any shared directories
       that have FTP enabled appear as sub directories of the user's
       home directory. When FTP access to a shared directory is
       disabled, then that directory no longer appears in the user's
       home directory.

       FTP access to shared directories can be disabled on a per
       share basis, but the FTP service can't be disabled.

       IT departments wishing to disable FTP will not be able to do so.
       When FTP access is disabled on all shared directories, users
       can still connect to their home directories.

       The interaction between storage quotas and content stored
       in a user's home directory via FTP was not tested.



    Interferes with Windows Browsing:

       The Iomega NAS A300U participates in Windows Browser elections.
       The NAS is configured in such a way that it always(1) wins the
       election even though multiple Windows servers exist on the
       same subnet.

       The fact that the NAS won the browser election would not normally
       be a problem except that the NAS does not correctly populate the
       browse list. This breaks any services that depend on browsing.
       In our case it disabled our Intel LanDesk server's ability
       to administer machines in our Windows NT domain.

       The NAS cannot be configured to disable participation
       in browser elections, and since it doesn't populate the
       browse list correctly it will disable any services that
       rely on Windows browsing.

          (1) The NAS can authenticate users against a Windows NT
              Domain that it has joined. To join an Active Directory
              domain the Active Directory must be running in mixed
              mode. In order to join a Windows domain the NAS must
              also be on the same subnet as the domain's Windows NT
              Primary Domain Controller or Active Directory PDC
              Emulator. So I put the NAS on the same subnet as our
              servers.

              The subnet that the NAS was tested on has over eleven
              Windows servers including a Windows Backup Domain
              Controller, a Windows Active Directory server, a Windows
              Active Directory PDC Emulator, a Windows Active Directory
              DNS server, several Exchange servers, a Blackberry
              Enterprise server, an Intel LanDesk server and several
              other test servers.

              Since there were such a large number of servers on the
              subnet I felt that the problem was significant enough
              to warrant an alert without determining the conditions
              under which the NAS could lose a browser election.

              It is believed that the NAS won the browser election
              because of the way Samba is configured. There isn't any
              administrative option for changing Samba browser behavior.



Fixes and Work Arounds:

    Iomega was notified of the problems on October 17, 2002. Iomega
    stated that they are working on the problem but could not give
    an estimated time for completion.

    As an interim solution I tested the following:

       1. Placed the NAS and an administrative workstation behind a NAT
          firewall.

       2. Specifically blocked HTTP and FTP access to the NAS and
          only forwarded the ports required for the services
          I wanted visible to users.

       3. This also eliminated the problem of the NAS always winning
          browser elections and interfering with other Windows
          services.



    Cons for the proposed work around:

       1. It requires a dedicated NAT firewall and administrative
          workstation.

       2. The NAS will not be able to join a Windows NT domain
          or an Active Directory Domain running in mixed mode so
          it will have to authenticate users against the local
          accounts database on the NAS instead of Windows domain
          accounts.



Contact Information:

    Keith R. Watson                  GTRI/ITD
    Systems Support Specialist III   Georgia Tech Research Institute
    keith.watson@gtri.gatech.edu     Atlanta, GA  30332-0816
    404-894-0836
-------------

Keith R. Watson                        GTRI/ITD
Systems Support Specialist III         Georgia Tech Research Institute
keith.watson@gtri.gatech.edu           Atlanta, GA  30332-0816
404-894-0836

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