From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 00:25:00 -0700
> On 10/18/23 3:31 PM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> > From: Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 14:47:43 -0700
> >> On 10/18/23 10:20, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> >>> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >>> Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 10:02:51 +0200
> >>>> On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 8:19 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 10/17/23 9:48 AM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> >>>>>> From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@xxxxxxxxx>
> >>>>>> Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:53:15 -0700
> >>>>>>> On 10/13/23 3:04 PM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Under SYN Flood, the TCP stack generates SYN Cookie to remain stateless
> >>>>>>>> After 3WHS, the proxy restores SYN and forwards it and ACK to the backend
> >>>>>>>> server. Our kernel module works at Netfilter input/output hooks and first
> >>>>>>>> feeds SYN to the TCP stack to initiate 3WHS. When the module is triggered
> >>>>>>>> for SYN+ACK, it looks up the corresponding request socket and overwrites
> >>>>>>>> tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn with the proxy's cookie. Then, the module can
> >>>>>>>> complete 3WHS with the original ACK as is.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Does the current kernel module also use the timestamp bits differently?
> >>>>>>> (something like patch 8 and patch 10 trying to do)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Our SYN Proxy uses TS as is. The proxy nodes generate a random number
> >>>>>> if TS is in SYN.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> But I thought someone would suggest making TS available so that we can
> >>>>>> mock the default behaviour at least, and it would be more acceptable.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The selftest uses TS just to strengthen security by validating 32-bits
> >>>>>> hash. Dropping a part of hash makes collision easier to happen, but
> >>>>>> 24-bits were sufficient for us to reduce SYN flood to the managable
> >>>>>> level at the backend.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> While enabling bpf to customize the syncookie (and timestamp), I want to explore
> >>>>> where can this also be done other than at the tcp layer.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Have you thought about directly sending the SYNACK back at a lower layer like
> >>>>> tc/xdp after receiving the SYN?
> >>>
> >>> Yes. Actually, at netconf I mentioned the cookie generation hook will not
> >>> be necessary and should be replaced with XDP.
>
> Right, it is also what I have been thinking when seeing the
> BPF_SOCK_OPS_GEN_SYNCOOKIE_CB carrying the bpf generated timestamp to the
> tcp_make_synack. It feels like trying hard to work with the tcp want_cookie
> logic while there is an existing better alternative in tc/xdp to deal with synflood.
>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>> There are already bpf_tcp_{gen,check}_syncookie
> >>>>> helper that allows to do this for the performance reason to absorb synflood. It
> >>>>> will be natural to extend it to handle the customized syncookie also.
> >>>
> >>> Maybe we even need not extend it and can use XDP as said below.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I think it should already be doable to send a SYNACK back with customized
> >>>>> syncookie (and timestamp) at tc/xdp today.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> When ack is received, the prog@tc/xdp can verify the cookie. It will probably
> >>>>> need some new kfuncs to create the ireq and queue the child socket. The bpf prog
> >>>>> can change the ireq->{snd_wscale, sack_ok...} if needed. The details of the
> >>>>> kfuncs need some more thoughts. I think most of the bpf-side infra is ready,
> >>>>> e.g. acquire/release/ref-tracking...etc.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I think I mostly agree with this.
> >>>
> >>> I didn't come up with kfunc to create ireq and queue it to listener, so
> >>> cookie_v[46]_check() were best place for me to extend easily, but now it
> >>> sounds like kfunc would be the way to go.
> >>>
> >>> Maybe we can move the core part of cookie_v[46]_check() except for kernel
> >>> cookie's validation to __cookie_v[46]_check() and expose a wrapper of it
> >>> as kfunc ?
> >>>
> >>> Then, we can look up sk and pass the listener, skb, and flags (for sack_ok,
> >>> etc) to the kfunc. (It could still introduce some conflicts with Eric's
> >>> patch though...)
> >>
> >> Does that mean the packets handled in this way (in XDP) will skip all
> >> netfilter at all?
> >
> > Good point.
> >
> > If we want not to skip other layers, maybe we can use tc ?
> >
> > 1) allocate ireq and set sack_ok etc with kfunc
> > 2) bpf_sk_assign() to set ireq to skb (this could be done in kfunc above)
> > 3) let inet_steal_sock() return req->sk_listener if not sk_fullsock(sk)
> > 4) if skb->sk is reqsk in cookie_v[46]_check(), skip validation and
> > req allocation and create full sk
>
> Haven't looked at the details. The above feels reasonable and would be nice if
> it works out. don't know if the skb at tc can be used in cookie_v[46]_check() as
> is. It probably needs more thoughts. [ note, xdp does not have skb. ]
>
> Regarding the "allocate ireq and set sack_ok etc with kfunc", do you think it
> will be useful (and potentially cleaner) even for the
> BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB if it needed to go back to consider skops? Then
> only do the BPF_SOCK_OPS_CHECK_SYNCOOKIE_CB and the xdp/tc can generate SYNACK.
> The xdp/tc can still do the check and drop the bad ACK earlier in the stack.
kfunc would be useful if we want to fall back to the default
validation, but I think we should not allocate ireq in kfunc.
The SOCK_OPS prog only returns a binary value. If we decide whether
we skip validation or not based on kfunc call (ireq allocation), the
flow would be like :
1. CG_OK & ireq is allocated -> skip validation and req allocation
2. CG_OK & no ireq -> default validation
3. CG_ERR -> RST
The problem here is that if kfunc fails with -ENOMEM and cookie
is valid, we need a way to tell the kernel to drop the ACK instead
of sending RST. (I hope the prog could return CG_DROP...)
If we allocate ireq first, it would be cleaner as bpf need not care
about the drop path.
1. CG_OK & mss is set -> skip validation
2. CG_OK & no mss set -> default validation
3. CG_ERR -> RST
