On Thu, Oct 5, 2023 at 1:41 AM Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Currently, there exists a system-wide setting related to CPU security > mitigations, denoted as 'mitigations='. When set to 'mitigations=off', it > deactivates all optional CPU mitigations. Therefore, if we implement a > system-wide 'mitigations=off' setting, it should inherently bypass Spectre > v1 and Spectre v4 in the BPF subsystem. > > Please note that there is also a 'nospectre_v1' setting on x86 and ppc > architectures, though it is not currently exported. For the time being, > let's disregard it. > > This idea emerged during our discussion about potential Spectre v1 attacks > with Luis[1]. > > [1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b4fc15f7-b204-767e-ebb9-fdb4233961fb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > include/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h > index a82efd34b741..61bde4520f5c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h > @@ -2164,12 +2164,12 @@ static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void) > > static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(void) > { > - return perfmon_capable(); > + return perfmon_capable() || cpu_mitigations_off(); Should we check cpu_mitigations_off() first before perfmon_capable() to avoid unnecessary capability checks, which generate audit messages? > } > > static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(void) > { > - return perfmon_capable(); > + return perfmon_capable() || cpu_mitigations_off(); > } > > int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags); > -- > 2.30.1 (Apple Git-130) >
