Re: [PATCH bpf v1 2/3] bpf: Repeat check_max_stack_depth for async callbacks

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On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 06:01:17AM +0530, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi wrote:
> While the check_max_stack_depth function explores call chains emanating
> from the main prog, which is typically enough to cover all possible call
> chains, it doesn't explore those rooted at async callbacks unless the
> async callback will have been directly called, since unlike non-async
> callbacks it skips their instruction exploration as they don't
> contribute to stack depth.
> 
> It could be the case that the async callback leads to a callchain which
> exceeds the stack depth, but this is never reachable while only
> exploring the entry point from main subprog. Hence, repeat the check for
> the main subprog *and* all async callbacks marked by the symbolic
> execution pass of the verifier, as execution of the program may begin at
> any of them.
> 
> Consider a function with following stack depths:
> main : 256
> async : 256
> foo: 256
> 
> main:
>     rX = async
>     bpf_timer_set_callback(...)
> 
> async:
>     foo()
> 
> Here, async is never seen to contribute to the stack depth of main, so
> it is not descended, but when async is invoked asynchronously when the
> timer fires, it will end up breaching MAX_BPF_STACK limit imposed by the
> verifier.

The fix is correct, but the above paragraph is misleading.
async doesn't and shouldn't contribute to the stack depth of main prog.
Could you rephrase it?

> 
> Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index e682056dd144..02a021c524ab 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -5573,16 +5573,17 @@ static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>   * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm
>   * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
>   */
> -static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> +static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
>  {
> -	int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end;
>  	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
>  	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
> +	int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end;
>  	bool tail_call_reachable = false;
>  	int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
>  	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
>  	int j;
>  
> +	i = subprog[idx].start;
>  process_func:
>  	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
>  	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
> @@ -5683,6 +5684,22 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  	goto continue_func;
>  }
>  
> +static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
> +		if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) {
> +			ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i);
> +			if (ret < 0)
> +				return ret;
> +		}
> +		continue;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
>  static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  				  const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx)
> -- 
> 2.40.1
> 




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