Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier:
1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ...
--- checkpoint ---
7: r9 += r7
8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y
This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range.
Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states:
I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers,
thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical. If the
path 1-6 is taken by verifier first, and checkpoint is created at (6)
the path [1-4, 6] would be considered safe.
Changes in this commit:
- check_ids() is modified to disallow mapping multiple old_id to the
same cur_id.
- check_scalar_ids() is added, unlike check_ids() it treats ID zero as
a unique scalar ID.
- check_scalar_ids() needs to generate temporary unique IDs, field
'tmp_id_gen' is added to bpf_verifier_env::idmap_scratch to
facilitate this.
- regsafe() is updated to:
- use check_scalar_ids() for precise scalar registers.
- compare scalar registers using memcmp only for explore_alu_limits
branch. This simplifies control flow for scalar case, and has no
measurable performance impact.
- check_alu_op() is updated to avoid generating bpf_reg_state::id for
constant scalar values when processing BPF_MOV. ID is needed to
propagate range information for identical values, but there is
nothing to propagate for constants.
Fixes: 75748837b7e5 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.")
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 17 ++++---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 73a98f6240fd..042b76fe8e29 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -313,11 +313,6 @@ struct bpf_idx_pair {
u32 idx;
};
-struct bpf_id_pair {
- u32 old;
- u32 cur;
-};
-
#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES)
@@ -559,6 +554,16 @@ struct backtrack_state {
u64 stack_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
};
+struct bpf_id_pair {
+ u32 old;
+ u32 cur;
+};
+
+struct bpf_idmap {
+ u32 tmp_id_gen;
+ struct bpf_id_pair map[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
+};
+
struct bpf_idset {
u32 count;
u32 ids[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
@@ -596,7 +601,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
struct bpf_verifier_log log;
struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 1];
union {
- struct bpf_id_pair idmap_scratch[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
+ struct bpf_idmap idmap_scratch;
struct bpf_idset idset_scratch;
};
struct {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 747d69b2eaa5..3d4be26b046f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -12942,12 +12942,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
+ bool need_id = src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id &&
+ !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
- if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id)
+ if (need_id)
/* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
* that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
* to propagate min/max range.
@@ -12966,7 +12968,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX;
- if (is_src_reg_u32 && !src_reg->id)
+ if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id)
src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
/* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 range otherwise
@@ -15122,8 +15124,9 @@ static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
* So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If
* so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
*/
-static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
+static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
{
+ struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map;
unsigned int i;
/* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */
@@ -15134,20 +15137,34 @@ static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
return true;
for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
- if (!idmap[i].old) {
+ if (!map[i].old) {
/* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
- idmap[i].old = old_id;
- idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
+ map[i].old = old_id;
+ map[i].cur = cur_id;
return true;
}
- if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
- return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
+ if (map[i].old == old_id)
+ return map[i].cur == cur_id;
+ if (map[i].cur == cur_id)
+ return false;
}
/* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return false;
}
+/* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID
+ * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero.
+ * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid.
+ */
+static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
+{
+ old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen;
+ cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen;
+
+ return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap);
+}
+
static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *st)
{
@@ -15246,7 +15263,7 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
- struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
+ struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
{
return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) &&
@@ -15255,7 +15272,7 @@ static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
- struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
+ struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
@@ -15292,15 +15309,42 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
case SCALAR_VALUE:
- if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap))
- return true;
- if (env->explore_alu_limits)
- return false;
+ if (env->explore_alu_limits) {
+ /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within()
+ * logic and requires everything to be strict
+ */
+ return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
+ check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
+ }
if (!rold->precise)
return true;
- /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
+ /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers?
+ *
+ * Consider the following BPF code:
+ * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ...
+ * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ...
+ * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
+ * 4: r6 = r7
+ * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ...
+ * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ...
+ *
+ * First verification path is [1-6]:
+ * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7;
+ * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark
+ * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id.
+ * Next verification path is [1-4, 6].
+ *
+ * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states:
+ * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
+ * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
+ *
+ * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states.
+ * ---
+ * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge.
+ */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
- tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
+ tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) &&
+ check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MEM:
@@ -15346,7 +15390,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
}
static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
- struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
+ struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
{
int i, spi;
@@ -15449,7 +15493,7 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
}
static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur,
- struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
+ struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
{
int i;
@@ -15497,13 +15541,13 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
- env->idmap_scratch))
+ &env->idmap_scratch))
return false;
- if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch))
+ if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch))
return false;
- if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch))
+ if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch))
return false;
return true;
@@ -15518,7 +15562,8 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
- memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
+ env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen;
+ memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map));
/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
* must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
@@ -15536,7 +15581,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return false;
if (old->active_lock.id &&
- !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch))
+ !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, &env->idmap_scratch))
return false;
if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock)
--
2.40.1
